The First Boer War (Dutch: Eerste Boerenoorlog, Afrikaans: Eerste Vryheidsoorlog,
Boer War 1899 - 1902
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Introduction
The Anglo Boer War was fought by Britain and her Empire against the Boers. The Boers were comprised of the combined forces of the South African Republic and the Republic of the Orange Free State. The Boer Republics declared war on 11th October 1899 and the conflict ended on 31st May 1902, a duration of 2 years and 8 months.
There were three distinct phases to the War:
Stage 1 - Boer offensive. At first, the Boer republican fighters were successful in three major offensives. Their commandos invaded northern Natal and besieged the town of Ladysmith, invaded Cape Colony to lay siege to the British garrisons in Kimberley and Mafeking. While the British did achieve some tactical victories at Talana and Elandslaagte, there were serious defeats for the British at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso which became known as 'Black Week' (10th - 15th December 1899).
Stage 2 - British response. With heavy reinforcements and the assumption of overall command by Lord Roberts with Lord Kitchener as his Chief of Staff, the British turned the situation around. Imperial troops eventually relieved the besieged towns of Ladysmith (28th February 1900), Kimberley (15 February 1900) and Mafeking (18th May 1900). On 13th March 1900 Roberts occupied Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State, and on 28th May the province was annexed and renamed the Orange River Colony. On 31st May, British troops entered Johannesburg and, on 5th June, Pretoria was taken. The Transvaal was annexed on 1st September 1900. To many it seemed that the war was over. At the end of November, Roberts made a triumphal return to England.
Stage 3 - Guerrilla war. Under the leadership of Louis Botha, Christiaan de Wet, Jan Smuts and de la Rey, the Boers abandoned the British style of warfare and increased their reliance on small and mobile military units. The mobility of these units enabled them to capture supplies, disrupt communications and undertake raids on the army of occupation. They were very successful in evading capture. In response, the British embarked on a scorched earth policy to deny supplies to the fighters. Approximately 30,000 farms were burnt. In March 1901 the need to restrict the movement of the Boers brought the development of 8,000 blockhouses and 3,700 miles of wire fencing guarded by 50,000 troops. This was followed by a number of 'drives' which had the intention of cornering the Boers but the operations mainly produced large numbers of displaced Boer and African families. These refugees were sent to concentration camps around South Africa. These measures were largely responsible for bringing the Boers to the negotiation table to end the War.
Chronology
1899
October: 11th.-Time fixed by Boers' ultimatum expired at 5 p.m. 14th.-Boers march on Kimberley and Mafeking. 15th.-Kimberley isolated. 20th.-Talana Hill captured by British under Symons. 21st.-Boers routed at Elandslaagte. 22nd.-Yule retires from Dundee on Ladysmith. 23rd.-Death of Gen. Symons at Dundee. 30th.-Nicholson's Nek disaster. 31st.-Gen. Buller lands at Cape Town.
November: 1st.-Boers invade Cape Colony. 2nd.-Ladysmith isolated. 9th.-General attack on Ladysmith repulsed. 15th.-Armoured train wrecked near Chievely. 23rd.-Methuen successfully attacks Boers at Belmont. 25th.-Methuen successfully attacks Boers at Enslin. 28th.-Methuen defeats Boers at Modder River.
December: 10th.-Gatacre surprised in night attack on Stormberg. 11th.-Methuen repulsed at Magersfontein, Gen. Wauchope killed. 15th.-Buller's force repulsed at Colenso. 18th.-Lord Roberts appointed Com.-in-Chief in S. Africa.
1900
January: 6th.-Disaster to Suffolk Regt. near Rensburg.-Attack on Ladysmith repulsed. 10th.-Lords Roberts and Kitchener arrive at Capetown.-Movement for relief of Ladysmith resumed. 11th. –Dundonald seizes pont at Potgeiter's Drift. 18th.-Buller makes second attempt to relieve Ladysmith. 23rd-24th.-Spion Kop captured on 24th, but evacuated during night.-Gen. Woodgate fatally wounded.
February: 5th. -Buller's third attempt to relieve Ladysmith commenced.-Lyttlelton crosses Tugela, and captures Vaal Krantz. 9th.-Lord Roberts arrives at Modder River. 13th.-Lord Roberts at Dekiel's Drift. 15th.-Lord Roberts at Jacobsdal.-Relief of Kimberley. 17th.-Rearguard action between Kelly-Kenny and Cronje en route to Bloemfontein.-Fourth attempt to relieve Ladysmith.-Buller advances on Monte Cristo Hill. 19th.-Buller takes Hlangwane Hill. 20th.-Cronje bombarded by Lord Roberts near Paardeberg. 21st.-Fifth Division crosses Tugela. 23rd.-Buller unsuccessfully attacks Railway Hill. 26th.-Buller makes fresh passage of Tugela. 27th.-Cronje surrenders at Paardeberg.-Pieter's Hill carried by Hildyard. 28th.-Relief of Ladysmith.-Clements occupies Colesberg.
March: 5th.-Gatacre occupies Stormberg.-Brabant defeats and pursues Boers. 7th.-Lord Roberts routs Boers at Poplar Grove. 10th.-Lord Roberts defeats Boers at Driefontein. 13th.-Lord Roberts occupies Bloemfontein. 31st.-Broadwood attacked at Waterworks.-Artillery entrapped at Koorn Spruit.
April: 7th.-Col. Dalgety isolated near Wepener. 25th.-Dalgety relieved by Chermside.
May: 12th-Lord Roberts enters Kroonstad.-Attack on Mafeking repulsed, Commandant Eloff taken. 13th.-Mahon repulses attack at Koodoosrand. 15th.-Buller occupies Dundee.-Plumer joint hands with Mahon. 17th-18th.-Relief of Mafeking. 28th.-Annexetion of Orange Free State. 31st.-British flag hoisted at Johannesburg.-Surrender of Yeomanry at Lindley.
June: 5th.-Occupation of Pretoria. 8th.-Hildyard takes Botha's Pass.-Mishap to 4th Derbyshires at Roodeval. 11th.-Fight at Allemans Nek. 12th.-Boers evacuate Langs Nek.-Roberts defeats Botha at Diamond Hill. 14th.-Boer attack on Sand River repulsed.
July: 4th.-Roberts and Buller join hands at Vlakfontein. 11th.-Disaster to Scots Greys and Lincolns at Uitval Nek. 21st.-Advance towards Komati Poort begins. 30th.-Surrender of Prinsloo and 3,000 Boers to Hunter in Brandwater basin.
August: 16th.-Eland's River garrison relieved. 26th.27th.-Fighting at Dalmanutha. 30th.-Nooigedacht occupied and 2,000 prisoners released.
September: 6th.-Buller occupies Lydenburg. 13th.-Proclamation issued by Roberts calling on burghers to surrender.-French occupies Barberton. 25th.-British force occupies Komato Poort.
October: 9th.-De Wet driven across the Vaal. 24th.-Buller leaves Cape Town for England. 25th.-Formal annexation of S. African Republic.
November: 6th.-De Wet defeated at Bothaville. 23rd.-Garrison at Dewetsdorp captured by De Wet. 29th.-Lord Kitchener takes supreme command.
December: 5th.-De Wet’s attempt to enter Cape Colony frustrated by Knox. 11th.-Roberts leaves Cape Town for England. 13th.-Clements defeated by Delarey at Nooitgedacht.-Mishap to Brabant's Horse at Zastron. 14th.-De Wet and Steyn escape through Sprinkhaans Pass. 16th-20th.-Boer raid into Cape Colony. 28th.-De Wet fails to break back into Cape Colony. 29th.-Mishap to Liverpools at Helvetia.
1901
January: 7th.-Boer attack on Belfast. 18th.-Delarey's force defeated near Ventersburg. 28th.-French enters Ermelo.-Smith-Dorrien repels Botha.-Sweeping movement commences in S. E. Transvaal.
February: 10th.-De Wet enters Cape Colony. 28th.-De Wet recrosses Orange River, having lost his guns.
March: 3rd.-Unsuccessful attack by Delarey on Lichtenburg. 22nd-23rd.-Babington routs Delarey at Ventersdorp.
April: 8th.-Plumer occupies Pietersburg. 14th.-Rawlinson captures laager at Klerksdorp.
May: 29th.-Delarey defeated by Dixon at Vlakfontein.
June: 2nd.-Kruitzinger captures James Town, Cape Colony. 6th.-Elliot captures De Wet's convoy near Reitz. 12th.-Disa.ster to Victorians near Wilmansrust. 26th.-Boers attack blockhouses on Delagoa Railway.
July: 13th.-Broadwood surprises Reitz.-Narrow escape of Steyn.
August: 6th.-Proclamation by Lord Kitchener of banishment of Boer leaders taken in arms after Sept. 15. 13th. -Kruitzinger's commandos routed near Steynsburg by Col. Gorringe. 17th.-Boer laager near Middelsburg captured by B.A.C.
September: 5th.-Lotter's commando captured by Col. Scobell. 10th.-Col. Crabbe routs Scheepers's commando at Laingsburg. 17th.-Major Gough surprised near Utrecht. Smut's commando surprises 17th Lancers at Elands River Poort. 26th.-Botha's attack upon Forts Itala and Prospect, on Zulu Border, repulsed. 30th.-Delarey's attack upon Kekewich's camp at Moedwill repulsed.
October: 16th.-Rhenoster River blockhouse line attacked. 20th.-Col. Dawkins captures three laagers, Nylstroom. 22nd.-Col. Benson surprises laager near Clipportje. 24th.-Kemp attacks Von Donop's convoy near Marico River. 25th.-Major Damant disperses Boers near Villiersdorp. 30th.-Col. Benson's column attacked at Brakenlaagte.
November: 1st.-Col. Kekewich captures Van Albert's laager. 7th.-Maritz attacks Picquetberg. 11th.-Major Pack Beresford, S.A.C., captures Dutoit's laager at Doornhoek. 14th.-De Wet attacks Col. Byng near Heilbron. 26th.-Gen. C. Knox captures Commandant Joubert.
December: 4th.-Gen. Bruce Hamilton captures laager near Ermelo. 10th.-Bruce Hamilton captures Bethel commando. 12th.-Bruce Hamilton captures Piet Viljoen's laager. 20th.-Majors Damant's and Bridgeford's columns severely handled by Boers. 23rd.-Kroonstad-Lindley blockhouse line completed. 24th.-De Wet captures Col. Firman's camp at Tweefontein. 29th.-Bruce Hamilton captures Gen. Erasmus east of Ermelo.
1902
January: 10th.-Bruce Hamilton captures Wolmaran's laager. 22nd.-Beyers enters Pietersburg concentration camp. 25th.-Gen. Ben Viljoen captured near Lydenburg. 28th.-Col. Du Moulin killed at Abraham's Kraal. 30th.-Col. Price takes Wessel's laager in Cape Colony.
February: 4th.-De Wet's last gun captured by Col. Hon. J. Byng. 5th.-Lord Kitchener commences Wolvehoek drive against De Wet. 8th.-British convoy captured near Fraserburg. 12th.-Mishap to 28th Co. Mounted Inf. at Klip River. 20th.-Col. Park captures commando in Bothasberg. 22nd.-Col. Mackenzie captures Hans Grobelaar's commando near Lake Chrissie. 24th.-Delarey captures Von Donop’s convoy near Wolmaranstad.
March: 7th.-Major Paris's column overwhelmed near Tweebosch by Delarey.-Methuen wounded and captured. 15th.-Bruce-Hamilton surprises Emmett's commando, captures Gen. Cherry Emmett. 31st.-W. Kitchener's column repulse Delarey.
April: 1st.-2nd Dragoons surprise laager at Boschman’s Kop. 8th.- Col. Colenbrander attacks Beyers near Pietersburg. 11th.-Kemp's men attack Kekewich's column at Rooiwal; repulsed with heavy loses.
May: 11th.-Col. Barker captures Manie Botha.-Rebels invest Ookiep. 7th.-Col. Cooper relieves Ookiep.-Serious accident to armoured train near Pretoria. 16th.-Conference at Vereeniging.-Jack Hindon, train wrecker, surrenders at Balmoral. 18th.-Aberdeen attacked by 120 Boers. 21st.-Lord Lovat captures Fouche's camp at Stapleford. 25th.-J. Hindon's corps surrenders at Balmoral. 27th.-Commandant Malan, mortally wounded, captured at Ripon Road, Cape Colony. 31st.-Conditions of surrender signed.
The First Boer War (Dutch: Eerste Boerenoorlog, Afrikaans: Eerste Vryheidsoorlog, literally First Freedom War) also known as the First Anglo-Boer War or the Transvaal War, was fought from 16 December 1880 until 23 March 1881.The southern part of the African continent was dominated in the 19th century by a set of epic struggles to create within it a single unified state.
British aggression into southern Africa was fuelled by three prime factors: first, the desire to control the trade routes to India that passed around the Cape; second, the discovery in 1868 of huge mineral deposits of diamonds around Kimberley on the joint borders of the South African Republic (called the Transvaal by the British), Orange Free State and the Cape Colony, and thereafter in 1886 in the Transvaal of a major gold find, all of which offered enormous wealth and power; and thirdly the race against other European colonial powers, as part of a general colonial expansion in Africa.
Other potential colonisers included Portugal, who already controlled West (modern day Angola) and East Africa (modern day Mozambique), Germany (modern day Namibia), and further north, Belgium (modern day Democratic Republic of the Congo) and France (West and Equatorial Africa, and Madagascar).
The British attempts in 1880 to annexe the Transvaal, and in 1899 both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (leading to the Second Boer War), were their biggest incursions into southern Africa, but there were others. In 1868, the British annexed Basutoland in the Drakensberg Mountains (modern Lesotho, surrounded by the Orange Free State and Natal) following an appeal from Moshesh, the leader of a mixed group of African refugees from the Zulu wars, who sought British protection against both the Boers and the Zulus.
The British did not try to stop Trekboers from moving away from the Cape. The Trekboers served as pioneers, opening up the interior for those who followed, and the British gradually extended their control away from the Cape along the coast toward the east, eventually annexing Natal in 1845.
Indeed, the British subsequently ratified the two new Republics in a pair of treaties: the Sand River Convention of 1852 which recognised the independence of the Transvaal Republic, and the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 which recognised the independence of the Orange Free State.
However, British colonial expansion was, from the 1830s, marked by skirmishes and wars against both Boers and native African tribes .n 1875 Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli's Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, in an attempt to extend British influence, approached the Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republic and tried to organise a federation of the British and Boer territories to be modelled after the 1867 federation of French and English provinces of Canada, however the Boer leaders turned him down. The successive British annexations, and in particular the annexation of West Griqualand, caused a climate of simmering unease for the Boer republics.
Outbreak of War
With the defeat of the Zulus, and the Pedi, the Transvaal Boers were able to give voice to the growing resentment against the 1877 British annexation of the Transvaal and complained that it had been a violation of the Sand River Convention of 1852, and the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854.Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley, after returning briefly to India, finally took over as Governor of Natal, Transvaal, High Commissioner of SE Africa and Military Commander in July 1880. Multiple commitments prevented Colley from visiting the Transvaal where he knew many of the senior Boers. Instead he relied on reports from the Administrator, Sir Owen Lanyon, who had no understanding of the Boer mood or capability.
Belatedly Lanyon asked for troop reinforcements in December 1880 but was overtaken by events.The Boers on 16 December 1880 revolted and took action at Bronkhorstspruit against a British column of the 94th Foot, who were returning to reinforce Pretoria.After Transvaal formally declared independence from the United Kingdom, the war began on 16 December 1880 with shots fired by Transvaal Boers at Potchefstroom. This led to the action at Bronkhorstspruit on 20 December 1880, where the Boers ambushed and destroyed a British Army convoy.
From 22 December 1880 to 6 January 1881, British army garrisons all over the Transvaal became besieged.Although generally called a war, the actual engagements were of a relatively minor nature considering the few men involved on both sides and the short duration of the combat, lasting some ten weeks of sporadic action.
The fiercely independent Boers had no regular army; when danger threatened, all the men in a district would form a militia organised into military units called commandos and would elect officers.Commandos being civilian militia, each man wore what he wished, usually everyday dark-grey, neutral-coloured, or earthtone khaki farming clothes such as a jacket, trousers and slouch hat.
Each man brought his own weapon, usually a hunting rifle, and his own horses. The average Boer citizens who made up their commandos were farmers who had spent almost all their working life in the saddle, and, because they had to depend on both their horse and their rifle for almost all of their meat, they were skilled hunters and expert marksmen.Most of the Boers had single-shot breech loading rifle such as the Westley Richards, the Martini-Henry, or the Remington Rolling Block. Only a few had repeaters like the Winchester or the Swiss Vetterli. As hunters they had learned to fire from cover, from a prone position and to make the first shot count, knowing that if they missed the game would be long gone.
At community gatherings, they often held target shooting competitions using targets such as hens' eggs perched on posts over 100 yards away. The Boer commandos made for expert light cavalry, able to use every scrap of cover from which they could pour accurate and destructive fire at the British with their breech loading rifles.The British infantry uniforms at that date were red jackets, black trousers with red piping to the side, white pith helmets and pipe clayed equipment, a stark contrast to the African landscape.The Highlanders wore the kilt. The standard infantry weapon was the Martini Henry single-shot breech loading rifle with a long sword bayonet. Gunners of the Royal Artillery wore blue jackets. This enabled the Boer marksmen easily to snipe at red-clad British troops from a distance.
The Boers carried no bayonets leaving them at a substantial disadvantage in close combat, which they avoided as far as possible. Drawing on years of experience of fighting frontier skirmishes with numerous and indigenous African tribes, they relied more on mobility, stealth, marksmanship and initiative while the British emphasised the traditional military values of command, discipline, formation and synchronised firepower. The average British soldier was not trained to be a marksman and got little target practice. What shooting training British soldiers had was mainly as a unit firing in volleys on command.
At the first battle at Bronkhorstspruit, Lieutenant-Colonel Anstruther
and 120 men of the 94th Foot (Connaught Rangers) were dead or wounded by Boer fire within minutes of the first shots. Boer losses totalled two killed and five wounded.
This mainly Irish regiment was marching westward toward Pretoria, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Anstruther, when halted by a Boer commando group. Its leader, Piet Joubert, ordered Anstruther and the column to turn back, stating that the territory was now again a Boer Republic and therefore any further advance by the British would be deemed an act of war.
Anstruther refused and ordered that ammunition be distributed. The Boers opened fire and the ambushed British troops were annihilated. With the majority of his troops dead or wounded, the dying Anstruther ordered surrender.The Boer uprising caught by surprise the six small British forts scattered around Transvaal, housing some 2,000 troops between them, including irregulars with as few as fifty men at Lydenburg in the east where Anstruther had just left. Being isolated, and with so few troops, all the forts could do was prepare for sieges, and wait to be relieved. The other five forts, with a minimum of fifty miles between any two, were at Wakkerstroom and Standerton in the south, Marabastadt in the north and Potchefstroom and Rustenburg in the west.
The three main engagements of the war were all within about sixteen miles of each other, centred on the Battles of Laing’s Nek (28 January 1981), Ingogo River (8/2/81) and the rout at Majuba Hill (27 February 1981). These battles were the outcome of Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley’s attempts to relieve the besieged forts.
Although Colley had requested reinforcements these would not reach him until mid-February. He was, however, convinced that the garrisons would not survive until then. Consequently, at Newcastle, near the Transvaal border he mustered a relief column (the Natal Field Force) of available men although this amounted to only 1,200 men. Colley’s force was further weakened in that few were mounted, a serious disadvantage in the terrain and type of warfare. Most Boers were mounted and good riders.
Nonetheless, Colley’s force set out on 24 January 1881 northward for Laing’s Nek on route to relieve Wakkerstroom and Standerton, the nearest forts.At the Battle of Laing's Nek on 28 January 1881, the Natal Field Force under Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley attempted with cavalry and infantry attacks to break through the Boer positions on the Drakensberg mountain range to relieve their garrisons.
The British were repulsed with heavy losses by the Boers under the command of Piet Joubert. Of the 480 British troops who made the charges, 150 never returned. Furthermore, sharpshooting Boers had killed or wounded many senior officers.Further actions included the Battle of Schuinshoogte (also known as Ingogo) on 8 February 1881, where another British force barely escaped destruction. Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley had sought refuge with the Natal Field Force at Mount Prospect, three miles to the south to await reinforcements. However, Colley was soon back into action.
On 7 February a mail escort on its way to Newcastle had been attacked by the Boers and forced back to Mount Prospect. The next day Colley, determined to keep his supplies and communication route open, escorted the mail wagon personally and this time with a larger escort.The Boer attacked the convoy at the Ingogo River crossing, but with a stronger force of some 300 men.
The firepower was evenly matched and the fight continued for several hours, but the Boer marksmen dominated the action until darkness and a storm permitted Colley and the remainder of his troops to retreat back to Mount Prospect. In this engagement the British lost 139 officers and men, half the original force that had set out to escort the mail convoy.On 14 February hostilities were suspended, awaiting the outcome of peace negotiations initiated by an offer from Kruger.
During this time Colley’s promised reinforcements arrived with more to follow. The British government in the meantime had offered a Royal Commission investigation and possible troop withdrawal, and their attitude toward the Boers was conciliatory. Colley was critical of this stance and, whilst waiting for Kruger’s final agreement, decided to attack again with a view to enabling the British government to negotiate from a position of strength. Unfortunately this resulted in the disaster of the Battle of Majuba Hill on 27 February 1881, the greatest humiliation for the British.
On 26 February 1881, Colley led a night march of some 360 men to the top of Majuba Hill that overlooked the main Boer position. Early the next morning the Boers saw Colley occupying the summit, and started to ascend the hill. The Boers, shooting accurately and using all available natural cover, advanced toward the trapped British position.
Several Boer groups stormed the hill and drove off the British at great cost to the British, including the loss of Major-General Colley. Many of the British were killed or wounded, some falling to their deaths down the mountain. This had such an impact that during the Second Boer War, one of the British slogans was "Remember Majuba." The Boers suffered only one killed and five wounded.Hostilities continued until 6 March 1881, when a truce was declared, ironically on the same terms that Colley had disparaged.
The Transvaal forts had endured, contrary to Colley’s forecast, with the sieges being generally uneventful, the Boers content to wait for hunger and sickness to strike. The forts had suffered only light casualties as an outcome of sporadic engagements, except at Potchefstroom, where twenty-four were killed, and seventeen at Pretoria, in each case resulting from occasional raids on Boer positions.Although the Boers exploited their advantages to the full, their unconventional tactics, marksman skills and mobility do not fully explain the heavy losses of the British. Like the Boers, British soldiers were equipped with breech-loading rifles (the Martini-Henry) but they were (unlike the Boers) professionals and the British Army had previously fought campaigns in difficult terrains and against elusive enemy such as the tribesmen of the Northern Territories in modern day Afghanistan.Historians lay much of the blame at the feet of the British command and Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley, in particular, but poor intelligence and bad communications also contributed to British losses.At Laing’s Nek it seems that Colley not only underestimated the Boer capabilities, but had been misinformed of, and was surprised by, the strength of the Boers forces.
The confrontation at Ingogo Nek was perhaps rash, given that reserves were being sent, and Colley had by then experienced the Boer strength and capabilities. Indeed, strategists have speculated as to whether the convoy should have proceeded at all when it was known to be vulnerable to attack, and whether it was necessary for Colley himself to take command of the British guard. Colley's decision to initiate the attack at Majuba Hill when truce discussions were already underway appears to have been foolhardy particularly as there was limited strategic value, as the Boer positions were out of rifle range from the summit. Once the Battle of Majuba Hill had begun, Colley’s command and understanding of the dire situation seemed to deteriorate as the day went on, as he sent unclear signals to the British forces at Mount Prospect by heliograph, first requesting reinforcements and the next stating that the Boers were retreating.
The poor leadership, intelligence and communications resulted in the deaths of many British soldiers.The British government of William Gladstone was conciliatory as it realised that any further action would require substantial troop reinforcements, and it was likely that the war would be costly, messy and protracted. Unwilling to get bogged down in a distant war with apparently minimal returns (the Transvaal at the time had no known mineral resources, or other significant resources, being essentially a cattle and sheep agricultural economy), the British government ordered a truce.Under instructions from the British government, Sir Evelyn Wood (who had replaced Colley upon his death on 27 February 1881) signed an armistice to end the war, and subsequently a peace treaty was signed with Kruger at O'Neil's Cottage on 6 March.
In the final peace treaty on 23 March 1881, the British agreed to Boer self-government in the Transvaal under a theoretical British oversight, the Boers accepting the Queen’s nominal rule and British control over African affairs and native districts. A three-man Royal Commission drew up the Pretoria Convention, which was ratified on 25 October 1881, by the Transvaal Volksraad (parliament). This led to the withdrawal of the last British troops.When in 1886 a second major mineral find was made at an outcrop on a large ridge some thirty miles south of the Boer capital at Pretoria, it reignited British imperial interests. The ridge, known locally as the "Witwatersrand" (literally "white water ridge" – a watershed) contained the world's largest deposit of gold-bearing ore. Although it was not as rich as gold finds in Canada and Australia, its consistency made it especially well-suited to industrial mining methods.
By 1899, when tensions erupted once more into the Second Boer War, the lure of gold made it worth committing the vast resources of the British Empire and incurring the huge costs required to win that war. The sharp lessons the British learned during the First Boer War which included Boer marksmanship, tactical flexibility, and good use of ground had largely been forgotten when the second war broke out 18 years later, which also led to heavy casualties as well as many setbacks for the British.
Nicolaas Pieter Johannes ("Niklaas" or "Siener") Janse van Rensburg
Anglo-Zulu Wars 1879-1896
The destruction of the Zulu kingdom 1879 -1896
In the 1870s settler and colonial determination to bring Blacks under firm political control had undermined the hard-won security that many African societies had achieved. This was due to changes in economic conditions in South Africa's hinterland, and the consequent need to secure sufficient political authority over Africans- which would ensure security and access to labour. These societies attempted to resist the extension of colonial control over them, one of which was the Zulu kingdom.
Sir Bartle Frere was appointed British high commissioner to South Africa in 1879 to realise the Policy of Confederation. This policy was set to bring the various British colonies, Boer republics and independent African groups under common control- with a view to implementing a policy of economic development. Sir Bartle Frere saw the self-reliant Zulu kingdom as a threat to this policy, a belief which was supported by Shepstone, the Secretary for Native Affairs. Shepstone averred that the Zulu people had revived their military power under Cetshwayo, which made them more of a threat to peace and prosperity in South Africa. On 11 December 1878, under the flimsy pretext of a few minor border incursions into Natal by Cetshwayo's followers, the Zulu were given an impossible ultimatum- that they should disarm and Cetshwayo should forsake his sovereignty.
The inevitable invasion of Zululand began after the ultimatum had expired on *10 January 1879 (see insert note). Instead of fragmenting the Zulu as Shepstone predicted, this rallied the Zulu to their king's cause.
Many historians mark the 10* January 1879 as the beginning of the Anglo-Zulu war, while others claim that the 12 January 1879 (first attack) or the 22 January 1879 (first decisive battle of Isandlwana) marked the beginning of the war. However, even the 10 January date is disputed as many sources say that the ultimatum actually expired on the 11 January 1879.
Under the overall command of Lord Chelmsford, the British forces -many of them colonials (Whites) or members of the Natal Native Contingent (Blacks) – began carrying out the general plan put in place for the invasion of Zululand. The main objective was to occupy the Zulu royal kraal at Ulundi by advancing on it from three directions. This operation was similar to the Zulu tactic of attacking from three sides by means of the main force or chest in the centre, and an extended left and right ‘horn’ on each side.
The right or Number I Column, commanded by Colonel C.K. Pearson, was to cross the lower Tugela River and advance towards Ulundi by way of Eshowe. The centre or main force, the Number III Column, advanced from Pietermaritzburg via Greytown to Helpmekaar, under the leadership of Lord Chelmsford himself. From Helpmekaar the centre force was to enter Zululand at Rorke's Drift and move eastwards to the royal kraal. The left or Number IV Column, commanded by Brevet Col Sir H. Evelyn Wood, concentrated at Utrecht with the object of reaching Ulundi from the north-west. In addition, two minor forces guarded the borders. The first of these forces was the Number II Column at Krantzkop, under Brevet Col A.W. Durnford to prevent the Zulus crossing the Tugela. The second was the Number V Column at Luneberg to safeguard the Transvaal, which had been annexed by the British in 1877 (see map).
The first attack of the war took place on 12 January 1879, when the position of Sihayo's kraal, situated in the Batshe valley, threatened the successful advancement of the British column. Under Chelmsford’s orders, the attacking force moved across the Batshe to attack a rocky gorge into which Sihayo's men had retreated, driving their cattle before them. The Natal Native Contingent showed reluctance to face the Zulus, some of whom were armed with rifles. In an attempt to thwart the attack, stones were also rolled down onto the attackers and after sharp action, the Zulus retreated, with 30 dead, 4 wounded and 10 captured. The British however, suffered only 2 casualties, with 15 wounded.
The Battle of Isandlwana
The main Zulu army left Nodwengu on 17 January to defend Zululand from the centre column. These forces were under the command of chiefs Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza and Mavu-mengwana kaNdlela Ntuli. Cetshwayo had promised his men that the British would be defeated in a 'single day'.
On the 17 January Chelmsford and his forces rode to Isandlwana, which he had selected as the site for his next camp.
On 20 January Chelmsford’s men arrived and set up camp at Isandlwana hill. Chelmsford encountered some local resistance and mistakenly assumed it to be the main Zulu force. This divided his column, half of which he took to support an engagement some fifteen kilometres away. Colonel Henry Pulleine was left in charge of the remaining forces, but did not organise his troops into a defensive circular ‘laager’ formation, as the wagons would be needed shortly to transport supplies. Colonel A.W. Durnford arrived the next day with a detachment to reinforce the camp and take over command.
Durnford, described as being 'as plucky as a lion but as imprudent as a child', impetuously pursued a Zulu foraging party. As he proceeded over the ridge of the Mabaso heights he encountered, to his horror, the Zulu army, a mass of 20 000 strong below. The Zulu had not intended to attack then, as it was a new moon and it was considered unwise to fight on a 'dark day'. However, once discovered, they had no choice but to go on the offensive. Pulleine was therefore forced to spread his firepower over a long distance, instead of concentrating his men in a tight formation.
The Zulu steadily advanced in the horn formation, their centre, or chest, pitted against Puileine's left flank. They suffered huge losses as the British concentrated fire on the chest, and the attack was temporarily stalled. The Zulu’s left horn outflanked Durnford's infantry and descended onto the British camp from behind. Realising he was surrounded, Pulleine tried to retreat in order to save the endangered camp. This allowed the Zulu centre to advance again, and while raising the national cry of 'uSuthu' the Zulu interposed themselves between the retreating British and their camp. Hand to hand combat ensued and the Zulu carried the day. A detachment of British troops tried to mount a final stand at a stream two miles away, but most retreated to Rorke's Drift or fled down the Mzinyathi River with the Zulu in pursuit. The British lost 52 officers, 727 white soldiers and 471 black men of the Native Contingent - a third of Chelmsford's men. The Zulu, ‘as was their custom, took no prisoners at Isandlwana, and spared no lives, despite pleas for mercy'’. Everything else left behind was carried off as booty.
The Battle of Rorke’s Drift and the Aftermath
The Charge of the 17th Lancers at the Battle of Ulundi. Source: http://www.britishbattles.com/
One day later, a depot at Rorke's Drift was attacked against the orders of Cetshwayo, who favoured a defensive strategy. After the overwhelming victory over the British at Isandlwana, Zulu reserve forces who were not involved in the previous day’s battle retaliated with an attack on the “hastily erected fort” at the small garrison of Rorke’s Drift. Here the British fought with ‘rifle fire and bayonets’ and the Zulu force, led by Prince Dabulamanzi, suffered 500 casualties in this fruitless engagement. This provided the British with “much needed propaganda to counter the Zulu success at Isandlwana”.
On the coast, the right column brushed aside Zulu resistance at the Nyezane river, before advancing to occupy the deserted mission station at Eshowe. The left column was also involved in heavy skirmishing around the Hlobane mountain. When the central British collapsed at Isandlwana, however, the left and right flanking columns were left exposed. The Zulus managed to cut Colonel C.K. Pearson’s right column off from the border, and Pearson's men were besieged for three months at Eshowe. The left flank column, however, managed to remain operative.
Chelmsford swiftly made his way back to Natal. The might of the British army had suffered a severe repulse and any thoughts of a quick British victory were put to rest. On the other hand, the Zulu themselves suffered terrible casualties, and worse was to follow.
After the defeat at Isandlwana British pride had to be restored, and reinforcements were sent for. Chelmsford's army advanced again into Zululand, inflicting heavy defeats on the Zulu in April at Gingindlovu, relieving Pearson's column, and at Khambula. The Zulu were now on the back foot. In July Chelmsford moved in on oNdini, and in a final onslaught known as the Battle of Ulundi, they secured an overwhelming military success. More than 1 000 Zulu were killed and Cetshwayo was forced to flee for safety, until he was captured in the Ngome forest in August and exiled to the Cape. The Zulu were then instructed to return to their homesteads and resume productive activities. The British, nonetheless, were at pains to explain that the war was against the Zulu royal house.
The Division of Zululand
The war itself had not destroyed the kingdom, but subsequent events served to divide the Zulu and undermine their economic and social cohesion. Taking a leaf out of Shepstone’s 'native policy', Sir Garnet Wolseley, the new British commander in Natal, divided the kingdom into thirteen territories under appointed chiefs. They were meant to represent the chiefly lineages of pre-Shakan times, which was a shaky argument at best, especially since one of them was John Dunn who had joined the British when hostilities began. Others had either been outrightly opposed to Cetshwayo or had shown little loyalty to him during the war. The chiefs’ allegiance was to those who had appointed them, and Britain thus effectively began to administer indirect rule over Zululand. Melmoth Osborn, who enthusiastically supported Shepstone's views, was appointed as British Resident in Zululand.
Unsurprisingly Zululand suffered civil strife as a result of this arrangement. Those who continued to espouse the old Zulu order were known as the uSuthu, and were led by Ndabuko kaMpande, Cetshwayo's brother. They were to come into conflict with the appointed chiefs and by 1887 had 'fought themselves to a standstill'.
In addition, a hut tax was imposed, not only on each hut but on every wife regardless of whether she occupied a hut. Wolseley's infamous settlement of Zululand had not destroyed the Zulu homestead-the basic productive unit in the kingdom's economy- nor had the Zulu been deprived of their land. The hut tax, however, served to divert some of the surplus accruing to an individual homestead head to the British government. Subsequently over 70% of the annual cost of administering Zululand was derived from this tax.
As the civil war intensified, the British realised that this settlement was simply not workable. Cetshwayo, encouraged by Bishop Colenso and his daughter Harriette- who both visited him in Cape Town-petitioned the British government and was granted permission to visit England to put forward his case for the restoration of the Zulu monarchy. In Zululand similar petitions were presented to the British Resident by the uSuthu.
Early in 1883 Cetshwayo was reinstalled as king, but his powers had been severely reduced. He was confined to a smaller area, surrounded by enemies, and his every move was watched by a Resident. Those who wished to show their loyalty to Cetshwayo were obliged to move into his central district of the kingdom. Zibhebhu, an arch opponent of Cetshwayo, whose allegiance was more to the colonial order than the royal house, occupied a large tract of territory to Cetshwayo's north, and forced uSuthu loyalists resident in his portion to return to Cetshwayo's area.
A pre-emptive strike by the uSuthu against Zibhebhu failed. Later Zibhebhu and Hamu, another of the appointed chiefs, invaded the uSuthu. Cetshwayo was soundly defeated at his newly built capital at oNdini in 1883, with the level of bloodshed exceeding anything the Zulu had experienced during Cetshwayo's reign. Matters worsened for the uSuthu when Cetshwayo died in late 1883- as the balance of power in Zululand had now shifted decisively to the Imperial administration, and its supporters in Zululand.
In a last-ditch measure to regain power, Cetshwayo's son, Dinuzulu, entered into a treaty with the Transvaal. In military terms, the alliance proved successful and Zibhebhu's army was forced out of the loyalists' territory. But this agreement came at a huge cost. In return for their assistance, the Boers were promised vast tracts of territory on Zululand's western margin, which they called The New Republic, with its 'capital' at Vryheid.
When the Transvaalers tried to claim even more land than what was agreed upon, the uSuthu refused. Having realised the extent of the chaos in Zululand, the British intervened. Dinuzulu was allowed to retain control of his portion of central Zululand, but the Boers were also acknowledged as owners of the New Republic. This lead to a Reserve area being set aside for those opposed to the loyalists. In Natal, pressure mounted for the annexation of Zululand, and almost inevitably it was annexed to the Crown in 1887. The promulgation of a Code of Laws placed Zululand under a similar 'Native Policy' to that in Natal.
Once more the uSuthu mounted resistance to the annexation, and again Zibhebhus services were called upon. The revolt was spectacularly successful for a short period, as the uSuthu under Dinuzulu made good use of the mountainous terrain to repulse a police contingent sent to arrest their leaders. Zibhebhus followers were attacked by Dinuzulu and forced to flee hastily from the Ndwandwe district. Finally reinforcements arrived, the uSuthu were driven from their hideouts, leading Dinuzulu to surrender. In 1889, he and his leading adherents were tried for treason, found guilty and sentenced to prison terms on St Helena.
In 1894 Dinuzulu was pardoned and allowed to return to Zululand, but as a mere induna, or state official, with no chiefly powers or privileges. To appease colonial interests, his return was coupled with the annexation of Zululand by Natal in 1897.
After eighteen years, settler interests had prevailed in the land of the Zulu, and the plans Shepstone initially envisaged for the kingdom could be put into place. White settlers and traders entered Zululand in increasing numbers, and Zululand was thus 'reconstructed'. The territory was divided among compliant chiefs who ruled with limited authority, and the governor of Natal became the supreme chief over Zululand. The situation was worsened further by several natural disasters between 1894 and 1897. These disasters included a plague of locusts, drought and the devastating rinderpest epidemic of 1897- which led to a massive decline in homestead production.
Already under stress from the imposition of the hut tax, many more Zulu men were forced into the Witwatersrand labour market to make ends meet and pay taxes. The gradual emergence of a permanent labouring class alongside a traditional economy, based on homestead production and cattle-keeping, led to new social divisions in Zulu society.
August 30, 1864 – March 11, 1926) was a Boer from the South African Republic - also known as the Transvaal Republic - and later a citizen of South Africa who was considered by some to be a prophet of the Boere (who are the smaller section of the language based macro group which became known as Afrikaners). Consequently his nickname became Siener, which is Afrikaans for "seer" or "soothsayer".
His seemingly accurate predictions of future events were typically wrapped in a patriotic, religious format.
During the Boer War he soon acquired a reputation which made him a trusted companion, if not advisor to General de la Rey and President Steyn. The true extent of his influence with these figures is disputed,though the very religious de la Rey seemed to have considered him a prophet of God
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He was born on the farm Palmietfontein in the Potchefstroom district as son of Willem Jacobus Janse van Rensburg and Anna Catharina Janse van Rensburg.
He only received 20 days of formal school training at the Rooipoort farm school, and spent much of his youth as a cattle herder. He could never write, but assisted by his mother learnt to read from the Bible. He never read anything else.
At age 16 he participated in a government expedition against the rebellious tribal leader Mapog. He survived malaria acquired on the expedition and settled near Wolmaranstad in the then western ZAR. He was elected as elder for the Hervormde Kerk at age 21, possibly due to his scriptural knowledge. He married Anna Sophia Kruger in 1884.
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Van Rensburg and his brother were commandeered to participate in the second Anglo-Boer War under General du Toit. He was however unarmed and never fired a shot, but delivered a stream of prophesies that continued throughout the war. As the seer would later explain, a nightly visitor would have woken him only a day before the outbreak of war, with a message that his work was dedicated to God.
Following the encounter he was beset with a fear that wouldn't dissipate. When his disturbed state continued to their sojourn in Kimberley, his superiors sent him home. Experiencing no relief, he returned to the Siege of Kimberley, where a vision revealed to him the defeat and loss of life that the war would bring about.Shortly afterwards, possibly at Graspan, his disturbed state lifted permanently when a soldier was wounded on his side, as a vision revealed to him shortly before. Van Rensburg then travelled with general Piet Cronjé but escaped the encirclement by British forces at Paardeberg. Subsequently he travelled with different commandos, where a number of apparently accurate predictions established his reputation.
A report of his visions attracted the attention of General de la Rey, who recruited Van Rensburg for his commando. On December 7, 1900, General de Wet found himself cornered against the Caledon River which was in flood, while British forces were assailing his position. When his surrender appeared imminent, a message of De la Rey was delivered by a Boer scout. Van Rensburg had foreseen the situation and the message outlined an escape route, which was duly followed, leaving the pursuers to succumb in the torrent De Wet had just traversed.De la Rey, also hard pressed by his enemy, dispatched Van Rensburg to accompany President Steyn to Roodewal, De Wet's safe retreat in the northern Free State. Here Van Rensburg advised them to wait upon two horsemen which he described, who arrived the next day with a message from acting President Schalk Burger.
On September 13, 1901, Van Rensburg found himself in the camp of Commandant Roux at Rietkuil near Vredefort. Sensing imminent danger, he advised those present, who had just retired for the day, to depart from the camp at once. Roux was slow to take heed, and his men more so, as scouts had not observed any enemy units. Van Rensburg, his wife and children escaped on a cart, shortly before the greater part of the camp was captured in a surprise attack
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Van Rensburg was present when Commandant Van Aardt's company returned from the action at Yzerspruit on February 25, 1902. Van Aardt was despondent as his brother was missing in action but Van Rensburg assured him that he was neither dead nor captured, but alive though in great pain. The wounded soldier was returned to camp the same evening, carried on the horse of a burgher who found him.
Before the Battle of Tweebosch, Van Rensburg gave a number of predictions indicating how the enemy would approach along the Harts River, and when he deemed them most vulnerable. He also envisaged how the victory would enhance De la Rey's reputation. Methuen's force collapsed in the face of De la Rey's sudden attack on March 7, 1902, and Methuen was captured.
On March 17, 1902, President Steyn, in the company of De Wet and Hertzog, arrived at Zendelingsfontein, De la Rey's headquarters near Klerksdorp, to consult De la Rey's physician about an eye ailment. Van Rensburg was once again dispatched to guard the president. Around the 23rd he had a vision of English troops arriving, but the president was unwilling to heed his warning, until De la Rey intervened urgently on Van Rensburg's behalf. The president departed for the safety of the Molopo River on the evening of the 24th. British troops arrived at Zendelingsfontein during the early hours of the 25th and captured two of De la Rey's adjutants.
Gaining entry to General Kemp's war council in the bushveld region, he soon warned them against attacking a retreating enemy, which would leave them vulnerable to encirclement.
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At the subsequent Battle of Harts River on March 31, 1902, some British units did fall back, though some Canadians stood their ground until overpowered by burgher forces. Kemp, though partially or grudgingly heeding the seer's visions, was generally reluctant to give him credit.
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In January 1901 Van Rensburg had a vision indicating the flight of three Boer women, who were soon found and rescued by his host Willem Bosman.
Days after rejoining De la Rey's commando he had visions of members of his own family being captured, and asked for leave to assist them.
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The Van Rensburg family fled from their farmhouse as English forces approached, but the wagon train carrying the elderly, women and neighbours was surprised and captured by traitors the following morning.
Van Rensburg's parents, eldest daughter Hester and four younger children were subsequently interned at the Mafeking concentration camp.
Van Rensburg, his wife, eldest son Willem and two daughters travelled with a group which managed to evade their pursuers, and Van Rensburg once again joined De la Rey's commando.
Upon meeting his wife again in mid October 1901, they found their farmhouse destroyed. Van Rensburg's ominous premonition concerning their daughters, Anna and Maria, was confirmed when news arrived that they and two relatives had died during an outbreak of measles in the concentration camp.
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When the Union of South Africa came out in support of the Allied Powers in World War I, Van Rensburg allied with the rebels. The rebellion received a fatal blow even before it started, when the influential general Koos de la Rey was accidentally killed on September 15, 1914.
De la Rey, when killed, was en route to General J.G.C. Kemp, who subsequently organised the rebellion in western Transvaal. On November 2, Kemp addressed a public meeting at Vleeskraal, near Schweizer-Reneke, with the locally influential Van Rensburg at his side. Van Rensburg also addressed the assembly, and assured them that his visions indicated they had little to fear. 610 men then joined the rebel cause, and with conscription imminent, the number of rebel volunteers grew to 1,800.
General Kemp decided on a company of 720 men, mostly farmers, which included Van Rensburg and his son. They departed immediately on a journey to join Manie Maritz in German South-West Africa. After a desert trek and much hardship they linked up with Maritz's company on November 29. Rebels under De Wet and Beyers were rounded up by South African forces in the days that followed.
Returning to South Africa, Maritz and Kemp engaged government forces at Nous, Lutzputs and finally at Upington, on February 3, 1915. Van Rensburg's son Willem was mortally wounded in the Upington clash, and the whole rebel force captured, with the exception of Maritz who fled via German South-West Africa, to Angola and from thence to Portugal,Van Rensburg, like his comrades, received a prison sentence. He however served about a year, first in Boksburg, then in the Old Fort, Johannesburg
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After his release Nicolaas van Rensburg returned to his farm Rietkuil, near Wolmaranstad. Some of his visions were then recorded by reverend Dr. Rossouw. Van Rensburg's daughter Anna Badenhorst also recorded a set of visions up to his death at age 61. The latter set is considered to be difficult to interpret and not very coherent.
With the outbreak of World War II, the collections of visions were considered inflammatory. Distribution was prohibited and some copies seized on orders of prime minister Jan Smuts.
Upon Anna's death her hand written documents were transferred to Lichtenburg museum's archives, where they were rediscovered in 1991. The farm and van Rensburg family cemetery are located 11 km from Ottosdal, in the North West Province.
Gen.De La Rey
His mother perceived his visions even as a toddler, and noticed that these seemed to disturb him. General Hertzog described him as someone continuously distracted by a maze of imagery and symbolism. In all, some 700 visions have been recorded.
The nature of his visions invariably concerned the welfare of the Boere, the Netherlands and Germany, and were experienced by him as visual imagery to be interpreted afterwards.
When the image of the sisal plant occurred in his visions, he for instance interpreted this as a portend of an important meeting, assembly or parliament. He is believed by some to have made many accurate predictions of local events, including foretelling the death of general Koos de la Reyand the political transition of South Africa after his own death.
At times his visions also concerned international events, among which the start of World War Iand the rise of Communism.He was unable to interpret some of his own visions. These, written down, are still open to interpretation, and believed by some to pertain to future events.
Boer soldier Deneys Reitz's account of the Boer War contains a colourful objective account of one of the seer's predictions (shortened):
... a prophet, a strange character, with long flowing beard and wild fanatical eyes, who dreamed dreams and pretended to possess occult powers. I personally witnessed one of the lucky hits while we were congregated around the General's cart.
Van Rensburg was expounding his latest vision to a hushed audience. It ran of a black bull and a red bull fighting, until at length the red bull sank defeated to its knees, referring to the British. Arms outstretched and eyes ablaze, he suddenly called out: See, who comes?; and, looking up, we made out a distant horseman spurring towards us. When he came up, he produced a letter from General Botha, hundreds of miles away.
General de la Rey opened it and said: Men, believe me, the proud enemy is humbled. The letter contained news that the English had proposed a peace conference. Coming immediately upon the prophecy, it was a dramatic moment and I was impressed, even though I suspected that van Rensburg had stage-managed the scene. Of the general's sincerity there could be no doubt as he firmly believed in the seer's predictions.
Second Anglo-Boer War - 1899 - 1902
'South African War ( a.k.a. the Anglo-Boer War) remains the most terrible and destructive modern armed conflict in South Africa’s history. It was an event that in many ways shaped the history of 20th Century South Africa. The end of the war marked the end of the long process of British conquest of South African societies, both Black and White'. - Gilliomee and Mbenga (2007).
The Causes
A number of interrelated factors led to the Second Anglo-Boer War. These include the conflicting political ideologies of imperialism and republicanism, the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand, tension between political leaders, the Jameson Raid and the Uitlander franchise.
Conflicting political ideology
After the First Anglo-Boer War the British government did not give up its ambition for unifying South Africa under Imperial British rule. The two Boer republics of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic or Transvaal still maintained their desire for independence. The Boer republics were a stumbling block for the British Empire.
The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand
Gold had been mined since the early 1870s but was discovered on the Witwatersrand, in the Transvaal, in 1886. Thousands of white and black South Africans were employed on the mines by 1890. South Africa became the single biggest gold producer in the world and this meant great growth for the independent Boer governments. The Transvaal now also became more prominent in international finance because the importance of gold as an international monetary system. Britain was the centre of industry and trade in the world at the time and needed a steady supply of gold to maintain this position.
Neighbouring independent states like the Orange Free State and British colonies like Natal could also gain from the riches and investment brought to the country. The Cape Colony wasn’t the leading economic state in the country anymore and a Boer republic took its place.
Even though the Transvaal gold mines were the richest in the world they were also the most difficult to mine because the reefs lay so deep under the ground. The gold had to be mined by shafts as opposed to open mines, like diamonds. Mining as an individual was not as efficient as using groups of miners with special skills. Large companies were created with local and international investment and individual miners were soon squeezed out.
Prospectors streamed to South Africa from all over the world, and especially from Europe. The Transvalers saw these foreigners, or Uitlanders, as a threat to their independence. In order to maintain its control of gold mining and the growth of the as they called them immigrant population, the Transvaal government restricted the voting rights of Uitlanders.Only foreigners who had been in the country for 14 years or more could vote. It was called the Uitlander franchise and didn’t really bother most Uitlanders, who had come to South Africa to make their fortunes, but it did cause strain between the Transvaal and British governments.
Tension between political leaders
Paul Kruger. Source: wikipedia.org
There were various political leaders with opposing views in power in different parts of South Africa during the 1890s. Paul Kruger was president of the Transvaal or South African Republic (SAR) and Cecil John Rhodes became the premier of the Cape Colony in 1890. Rhodes was from Britain and had made his fortune in South Africa by mining diamonds. He was also a supporter of the British imperial plan to unite South Africa under British rule. Kruger was a supporter of Boer independence and the two leaders were in direct conflict with each other.
Rhodes believed that if the SAR was left to grow financially it would eventually grow in size and topple Britain from its position of power in South Africa. He specifically did not want the SAR to gain access to a route to the sea, as this would seriously affect the economies of the British colonies. Rhodes and Britain were determined to stop the SAR’s expansion.
The Jameson Raid
By 1895 Britain was getting more confident about taking action in South Africa. Joseph Chamberlain was appointed Colonial Secretary. He joined forces with Rhodes to try to develop and promote the British Empire in South Africa.
In September and October 1895 the Drift Crisis between the Cape Colony and the Transvaal or SAR developed. The Cape had finished building a railway line to Johannesburg and tried to get as much of the Transvaal’s railway traffic by reducing its rates.It was aware that the Transvaal's Delagoa Bay line was al most complete.The Transvaal government increased the rates on the part of the railway that ran through the Transvaal once it had crossed the Vaal River. In answer to this goods, were taken to the Vaal River by train, and then taken further by wagon to avoid paying the higher prices in the Transvaal. Kruger reacted by blocking access to the Transvaal, closing the drifts on the Transvaal side.
The British government demanded that Kruger open the drifts and used the situation to involve itself directly in Transvaal affairs. Rhodes planned an uprising of Uitlanders in Johannesburg. The uprising was timed to coincide with an invasion of the Transvaal from Bechuanaland (present day Botswana), by Dr Leander Starr Jameson. Rhodes wanted to take over the government of the Transvaal and turn it into a British colony that would join all the other colonies in a federation. Chamberlain helped plan the Jameson Raid.
The Jameson Raid which began on on 29th December 1895, was a total failure. Jameson waited on the border, but the Uitlander leaders in Johannesburg argued among themselves about the kind of government to be put into place after the invasion. Many of the Uitlanders had no interest in violent uprising, but preferred to celebrate the New Year. Rhodes decided to stop the raid, but it was too late because Jameson and his party had already crossed into the Transvaal.
Jameson’s troops tried to cut communication lines to Pretoria, but cut the wrong lines. This meant that the Transvaal government knew the raiders were on their way before they reached Johannesburg. On 2 January 1896 Jameson had to surrender at Doornkop near Krugersdorp. The prisoners were handed over to their own government and the Uitlander leaders who had been part of the plot were put to trial in Johannesburg. Some of them were condemned to death, but the sentences were later reduced to large fines.
Rhodes was forced to resign as the premier of the Cape Colony and the political problems between Afrikaans and English-speaking people became worse than ever in the colony. The Orange Free State co-operated more closely with the Transvaal. Transvaal residents felt that they were being threatened and Uitlanders were treated with more suspicion than ever before.
Read a more detailed feature on the Jameson raid
The Uitlander Franchise
The Uitlanders were not only from Britain, but came from all over the world to make money on the goldfields in the Transvaal. Some of them were not interested in the political situation in the republic and were not concerned about the fact that they couldn’t vote. Some Uitlanders felt that they contributed to the exploitation of the riches in the republic and had the right to a say in the way the country was being run.
The Transvaal government realised that this could be a threat to the republic’s independence, but also knew that it couldn’t ignore the Uitlanders’ demands. The foreigners could apply for citizenship or naturalisation after 5 years of living in the Transvaal. A Second Volksraad was created in 1890 and new laws were made. Uitlanders who had been naturalised for two years could now vote. The Second Volksraad only had say in local matters in Johannesburg and on the mines; any bills it put forward could only become laws if the First Volksraad agreed. Only Uitlanders who had been in the country for a full 14 years or longer could vote for the first Volksraad.
Now Uitlanders had a say in political matters, but the First Volksraad still ran the country. Very few Uitlanders used their right to vote, but the Second Volksraad took its responsibilities seriously.After the Jameson Raid Chamberlain wanted to win back some of the respect he had lost because of the raid’s failure. He was more determined to make the South African union a reality and decided to use diplomatic power to do so. He invited Kruger to London for talks about the Uitlander Franchise, but the president would not discuss his country’s internal affairs. He felt that this would create the impression that the SAR could not take care of its own politics independently.
Next Chamberlain called a meeting in London to try to involve Britain directly in Transvaal affairs. His interference caused even more tension between the two countries. He also sent Sir Alfred Milner, another loyal supporter of British expansion, to South Africa as British High Commissioner.Milner hoped that Kruger would not be re-elected, but in 1898 he was. Milner was afraid that the Boer republics wanted to take over the whole country and told Chamberlain that war was the only way to prevent that from happening. In December 1898 Transvaal police shot an Uitlander called Tom Edgar. The officer responsible said that it was in self-defence, but the Uitlander community reacted as if it was a political incident. This made the franchise issue an important factor in the outbreak of the war because political tension between Boers and British subjects in the Transvaal became worse.
