
THE VOORTREKKERS
The Battle - Andries Pretorius and his men advance
After the fall of Port Natal Port Natal Andries Pretorius arrived from Graaff-Reinet. On 25 November 1838 Pretorius took over leadership as Commandant-General of the Voortrekkers in Natal. He immediately re-organised the Voortrekkers and started to prepare a retaliatory attack on the Zulu.
On Sunday, 9th December, Pretorius and his followers made a vow to God that in the case of victory; they would build a church to honour God and they would tell there children to observe a day of thanksgiving. (Recent research has put a question mark over the vow and its existence as 'thanksgiving' was not commemorated in the years immediately following the battle, but the church was built).
The Pretorius party crossed the Ncome (Buffalo) River, and on Saturday 15 December, they reached a tributary (Thukela). Their scouts reported that a large AmaZulu force was advancing (10 000-20 000 Zulu warriors). The Zulu army was led by Dingane's generals Dambuza (Nzobo) and Ndlela kaSompisi. After the scouts had given the warning the Voortrekkers moved there wagons into a laager (circular formation) in the best strategical position possible, between a deep pool in the river and a donga (a large ditch). The Voortrekkers force consisted of 470 men. There were only two gaps in the laager and in each, a canon was placed.
16 December 1838: The Battle
At dusk on the 15th December the Amazulu had already begun to circle the laager. A heavy mist surrounded the laager and only lifted in the early hours of the morning, this made visibility poor. At dawn on the 16th December 1838 the Zulu warriors equiped with assagais and shields swept towards the laager. To be able to use their assagais effectively they had to come as close as possible to the defenders.
The Voortrekkers were equiped with far superior weaponry and responded to the Zulu advancement with musket and cannon fire. Eyewitnesses and writers differ slightly on the exact details of the battle, but at dawn when the first Zulu attack began, the firing was apparently so heavy that the Zulu warriors could not be seen through the smoke. The main shortcoming of the Voortrekkers weapons was the lengthy reloading times. The first Zulu attack had scarcely been repulsed when a second was launched, this time the Zulu warriors almost reached the laager... Meanwhile hundreds of warriors were hiding in the donga. Sarel Cilliers and 80 others attacked them during a short lull in the fighting. When the Zulu's, who had withdrawn about 50 yards from the laager, failed to launch a third attack, Pretorius sent some men to draw them out to seal the victory. Pretorius' cavalry met with determined resistance from the Zulu Warriors, and it was only after a third sortie that the Zulu's were put to flight, pursued by the Voortrekkers. At midday the pursuit was called off. More than 3000 corpses were counted around the laager. Only, 3 Voortrekkers (including Pretorius himself) were wounded, none were killed. The Ncome River became red with the blood of the slain. Hence the battle became known as the battle of "Blood River".
After this defeat, the Zulu kingdom never really recovered. Dingane's half-brother Mpande allied with Pretorius to defeat Dingane, who was eventually killed by the Swazi as he tried to regroup further north. Europeans now increasingly began to dictate the nature of Zulu politics.
Timeline of Land Dispossession and Segregation in South Africa 1800-1899
The nineteenth century was a period of several events whose socio-political and economic impact profoundly changed South Africa and the African continent. Colonial conquest and rapid land dispossession was accelerated during this period. Conversely, fierce resistance was launched by African people in response to their loss of land, livestock and political power. As voortrekkers moved away from the Cape Colony to escape British rule, they fought, seized and occupied land while dispossessing Khoi, San and African communities in the process. This opened up the interior of South Africa to further colonial conquest. The British in turn, pursued the voortrekkers by annexing more land and at times even claiming it back from the voortrekkers. In some instances, land dispossession was achieved by stealth through “treaties” which colonists claimed were signed by leaders of communities. The mineral revolution which exploded during the century further contributed to land dispossession as the white colonial government sought to force Africans off their land to become cheap labourers in the newly established mines in Kimberley and the Transvaal.
1803
February, The British returns the Cape Colony to the Batavian Republic. The new administration reinforces the colonial government’s claims to the frontier zone in the east and vows to restore the European dominated social order. Subsequently, the district of Uitenhage is established with Ludwig Alberti as the landdrost and several white farmers who had deserted the area due to attacks by the Khoi and Xhosa return.
May, A peace settlement is reached between the Batavian government and Khoisan after the parties fought over issues of land and livestock raids.
1809
1 November, The Caledon Code is promulgated as an attempt to regulate the relationship between the Khoikhoi and the colonists. In terms of the Act, each Khoikhoi within the confines of the colony had to have a fixed place of residence and carry a valid passes should they move from one place to another.
1811-12
The British assisted by about 700 men of the Cape Regiment drive an estimated 20 000 Xhosa people, men, women and children over the Fish River from Zuurveld in the Fourth War of Dispossession. They then establish 27 military garrisons along the River to prevent Xhosa people from returning and station more British troops in Grahamstown and Cradock.
1813
The freehold land tenure under a perpetual quitrent system is introduced. It replaces the old system of the loan farms.
1814
Cape Governor Sir John Cradock changes the system of land tenure from leasehold to freehold for white farmers. Prior to this period, farmers paid little for the land nor made major developments as they recognized that they did not own the land. This measure was introduced to allow for a denser population of white people on the eastern border to act as buffer against black people.
1817
Lord Charles Somerset meets the Ngqika, a Xhosa chief, at the Kat River and is forced to cede land between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers to the British.
1818
The British invade Xhosa territory by attacking Ndlambe and seize 23 000 cattle marking the outbreak of the Fifth War of Dispossession. Subsequently, those Xhosa people whose cattle had been seized rally behind Makhanda ka Nxele who leads an attack of 6000 warriors on Grahamstown.
1825
Landdrost Andries Stockentroom begins issuing temporary permits allowing white farmers to graze their livestock north of the Orange River, but they are not allowed to trade or erect buildings. This changes later in the decade as farmers stop asking for permission and simply inform the magistrate.
1828
Ordinance 49 of 1828 is passed. The Ordinance allows the government to source labourers from ‘Frontier Tribes’. All black workers were given passes for the sole propose of working and all contracts over a month long were to be registered.
1829
January, Maqoma raids Bawana a Thembu chief forcing the latter’s followers to flee across into territory seized by the colonists.
Stockenstroom orders the expulsion of Maqoma from the Kat River Valley and establishes a settlement for landless Khoikhoi to create a buffer zone between the Xhosa and white settler farmers, and to consolidate territory seized by the colonists. Maqoma responds by increasing cattle raids on white farms forcing them to informally allow him to return to the territory.
1834-35
21 December, The Xhosa launch an attack on the British after Xhoxho was injured by a British patrol sparking the Sixth War of dispossession. Other long standing grievances such as loss of land, cattle also fuel the rebellion. A massive herd of 276 000 stock was seized by the Xhosa fighters and 456 farms are destroyed. The British retaliate and later murder Hintsa, and Colonel Harry Smith annexes the area between Keiskama and Kei renaming it Queen Adelaide Province.
1835
May, Benjamin D’Urban proclaims the annexation of what he called Queen Adelaide Province which was land extending to the Kei River, and announces his intention to fight the Xhosa and expel them across the river. He appoints Harry Smith to incorporate African chiefdoms into the newly proclaimed province.
1836
October, The British abandon their annexation of the Queen Adelaide Province and hand the seized land back to the Xhosa.
1837
The voortrekkers under the leadership of Hendrik Potgieter defeat the Ndebele under Mzilikazi at the Marico River and seize vast tracts of land between the Limpopo and Vaal Rivers.
1838
16 May, The voortrekkers led by Andries Pretorius fight and defeat the Zulu at the banks of the Ncome River (“Battle of Blood River) and dispossess them of their land. Subsequently, they establish the Republic of Natalia.
1845
Two parties of voortrekkers arrive near areas settled by Pedi people and establish a settlement at Ohrigstad.
5 July, King Sekwati and Boer leader Hendrik Potgieter ‘sign’ a peace treaty. The treaty becomes a subject of dispute between the Boers and Pedi. The former claim the treaty gave them full ownership and title to a large area of Pedi lands, while the latter claim treaty merely allocated land on which trekkers could settle without relinquishing his people’s ownership to the land. When trekkers offer cattle as payment to acquire more land to establish a farming settlement Sekwati refuses their offer.
1846
A Land Commission is appointed to demarcate locations for Africans in Natal. The commission recommends that seven large locations be set apart for the settlement of black people.As a consequence, Theophilus Shepstone the Commissioner of Native Affairs moves an estimated 80,000 African people to 'Locations' in different parts of the country.
26 July, King Mswati signs a treaty with voortrekkers as a way of protecting his kingdom against Zulu invasion. He grantstrekkers the right to lands bounded by the Oliphants River in the North and the Crocodile and Elands River in the South. The land covered areas settled by the Pedi, Ndzundza Ndebele and several Sotho speaking groups.
1847
The British colonial administration displaces the Korana and /Xam from their lands to increase grazing pastures for sheep. This results in the raid of the settler farmer’s livestock by the Korana and other San groups whose lives had been disrupted.
1848
10 February, A Land Government Commission established during the year states that the extent of land recommended by the 1846 - 47 Commission is excessive. The commission apportions land to white settlers.
1850
Sir George Grey confiscates land from black African people leaving them to search for work in farms.
1852
The British under Sir George Cathcart attack the BaSotho under king Moshoeshoe.
1853
November, A resolution taken by the Volksraad enables District Commandants to grant land for occupation by Africans on condition of ‘good behaviour’. However, the under the resolution there was no individual title, Africans had to use the land communally, chiefs were regarded as trustees of the tribe. However, power over the land still remained the hands of the white government.
1855
18 June, Resolution 159 is adopted by the Transvaal government. It prohibits anybody who was not a burgher from owning land and also prohibits Africans from having burger rights.
1856
Voortrekkersdeclare an independent Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) and lay claim to the Transvaal and the land up to the Limpopo River.
1857
29 April, Lieutenant General Scott issues a Proclamation offering vacant crown lands which are between 300 and 3000 acres. This increases land speculation by white settlers who in turn after purchasing the land lease it to Africans at yearly rental of five shillings.
1858
The First Basotho Boer War breaks out as avoortrekkercommando attacks Thaba Bosiu. In response, the Sotho mobilise an army of 10 000 warriors who raid unprotected settler farms and defeat the voortrekkersand force them to retreat.
The Tlhaping /Kora of the Tswana ethnic group raid outlaying Boer farms sparking retaliation by the voortrekkers, who in turn seize thousands of cattle, behead a Chief and carry away women and children as apprentices.
1864
April, The Natal Native Trust is created enabling the British colonial government to place under its control all the unalienated location land in Natal. This land was to be held in trust for the African population with the Executive Council of Natal acted as trustees.
1865
J.H Brand launches an attack on Thaba Bosiu but the voortrekkers are repulsed. They then besiege the Mountain and resort to a ‘scorched earth’ policy burning crops, villages and seizing livestock. King Moshoeshoe refuses to surrender and appeals for British protection.
1866
The voortrekkers go to war with the BaSotho in order to seize the fertile Caledon Valley, and defeat the BaSotho. They force them to ‘sign’ the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu under which the BaSotho lost all of their land north of the Caledon River, and a large area in the northwest.
June, Thirteen beacons are erected to fix a boundary between Swaziland and the South African Republic taking some of the kingdom’s land, and despite objections by the Swazi, the beacons become a recognized boundary which was accepted by both the voortrekkers and the British.
1867
Village raids of the Venda conducted by voortrekkerarmies in the Transvaal spark a rebellion led by king Makhado. The voortrekkersare defeated and pushed out of lands which they had occupied. Makhado also destroys the settlers’ settlement at Schoemansdal.
War breaks out between BaSotho and voortrekkersafter king Moshoeshoe refuses to give up land to them.
1868-9
The first Korana rebellion breaks out after /Xam speaking San groups joined forces with the Korana to halt the advance of the white settler famers who were increasingly taking over their land and grazing pastures.
1870
February, Ruiters and 25 followers are captured bringing to an end active operations against the Korana. All three captured chiefs, Kivido, Rooy and Ruiters are tried, convicted and imprisoned on Robben Island.
1876
July, The South African Republic declares war on the Pedi which ends in defeat for the Afrikaner owing to combination of Pedi ingenuity and division within the combined Afrikaner force.
1877
The British occupy the South African Republic and in terms of the Article 21 of the Pretoria Convention appoint a Commission to investigate land ownership by Africans. Amongst its members are S.J.P. Kruger, Vice-President of the Transvaal State, George Hudson, British Resident, and H.J. Schoeman Native Commissioner for Pretoria and Heidelberg. The Committee recommends that Africans can purchase or acquire land in any manner; however the transfer of that land should be registered on their behalf in the name of a Native Location Commission.
The Second Korana War which lasts until the following year breaks out around the Orange River after the Korana and San launch livestock raids on settler farms. Subsequently, more Korana chiefs are arrested and imprisoned on Robben Island, and the British propose to enlist the landless communities as servants.
1878
Xhosa people who had settled in the Prieska region south of the Orange River, ally with the Kora and San to launch an attack on white farms in the southern districts of Griqualand. As the attacks spread they are joined by the Griqua and Tlhaping. Loss of land to white settlement and loss of authority by chiefs over their own people were primary causes of the rebellion.
July, The colonial forces launch an attack and quell the rebellion Xhosa, Kora and San rebellion.
1879
Zulu warriors defeated the British in 1879 at the Battle of Isandlwana
22 January, The British forces are defeated by the Zulu impis at the Battle of Isandlwana.
28 November, The Pedi under the leadership of Sekhukhune are defeated by British forces leaving about 1000 Pedi warriors dead. Sekhukhune is captured and imprisoned in Pretoria.
The Cape government annexes Fingoland (Mfenguland) and Griqualand west which constitutes two thirds of the territory between the Cape and Natal.
1882-3
White farmers lay a siege of Ndzundza-Ndebele for nine months who when faced with starvation are forced to surrender. Their fertile lands are seized and divided among the voortrekkers. Each war participant is given five families to use as servants who work for little or no pay on the farms.
1885
Gcalekaland and Thembuland are incorporated into the Cape Colony.
1887
After defeating the Zulu warriors at the Battle of Ulundi, the British formally annex Zululand to pre-empt simmering threat of the Zulu people fighting back to recover the loss of their territory. The kingdom is broken up into 13 chiefdoms by Garnet Wolseleyand placed under different chiefs each with a British resident.
1891
Squatting on crown lands by black people was prohibited by Volksraad Resolution No. 359.
1894
The Glen Grey Act (No. 25 of 1894) is passed. Under the Act, the alienation and transfer of land was to be approved by the governor. Subletting or subdivision of the land was prohibited and the principle of ‘one man one plot’ was to be applied, thus the rest of the people who were not allocated land were forced to go and find work out elsewhere. Although declared in the Glen grey District, itis immediately extended to the Transkeian districts of Butterworth, Idutywa, Ngqamakwe and Tsomo by Proclamation No. 352 of 1894.
The Cape government incorporates Pondoland along the east coast.
1895
British Bechuanaland passes into the hands of the Cape Colony. The Act of Annexation makes special provision that no lands reserved for the use of Africans in the territory were to be alienated.
Law No. 21 of 1895 prohibits farmers from employing more than 5 African householders on one farm without government permission. However, this proves to be ineffective as Land Companies repeatedly break the law.
1898
Voortrekker commandos underJoubert isolate the Venda chiefdoms and attack them one by one resulting in their defeat. Some of the Venda people are driven across the Limpopo River and their territory is incorporated into the Transvaal.
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Colonial conquest and resistance, Pre 1900
Several factors seemed to pave the way to apartheid, among them a colonial conquest, land dispossession, economic impoverishment, and exclusion from citizenship of Africans. Part one examines the historical roots of apartheid, from the colonial occupation of the Cape in 1652 through the creation of the Union of South Africa and the period between the formation of the Union and the Nationalist Party coming into power - (1910-1948).
Jan van Riebeeck and his expedition of Dutch Calvinist settlers landed at the Cape on 6 April 1652. van Riebeeck had received a commission from the Dutch East India Trading Company (VOC) to establish a refreshment station for passing ships. The station was to supply the ships travelling East, to obtain spices and other goods, with fresh fruit, vegetables and meat. The settlers grew the vegetables and fruit themselves, but meat was obtained through trade with the indigenous population (mainly Khoikhoi) derogatorily referred to as “natives”.
From the beginning their relationship with the Khoikhoi was antagonistic and trade with them for slaughter stock soon degenerated into raiding and warfare. In 1657, the colonial authorities started a process of allotting farms to European settlers (“free burghers”) in the arable regions around Cape Town, where wine and wheat became the major products.
As the port developed the need for labour increased. In response to the colonists’ growing demand for labour, the VOC imported slaves from Angola, Mozambique, Madagascar, and South East Asia. Soon more Dutch settlers arrived followed by settlers from all over Europe. The colony gradually expanded along a frontier at the expense of the Khoikhoi, Xhosa, and other indigenous peoples, a process similar to the one that unfolded in North America, Australia and New Zealand.
Slavery and early colonisation in South Africa
In South Africa, destruction of Khoi societies produced an underclass of domestic and farm workers, but their ability to earn a decent wage was severely curtailed by the Dutch East India Company's use of slaves. Little is known of the lives of ordinary people at this time, but archival evidence reveals glimpses of slaves’ struggles against harsh conditions imposed by their white oppressors.
Eventually, Great Britain pronounced the emancipation of slaves in the Cape Colony in 1833, but the draconian Master and Servant laws replaced slavery that preserved a social hierarchy in which race closely corresponded to class.
Colonial conquest by the Netherlands until 1795, before it fell to the British Crown, before reverting to Dutch Rule in 1803 and again to British occupation in 1806, stimulated limited if uneven capitalist growth.
Expansion from the Cape, the Trek Boers and the Great Trek
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Cape settlers were expanding their territory northeast. The Trek Boers seeking fresh grazing for their cattle, primarily, led this expansion. These cattle farmers had no fixed dwelling places and many led a semi-nomadic existence, moving ceaselessly between summer and winter pastures. As most trek farmers had large families, the system encouraged swift expansion. The Cape Government had done nothing to hinder expansion inland since it provided a source of cheap meat.
As the trekkers’ expansion increased, they inevitably came into conflict with, first, the Khoikhoi and later the Xhosa people into whose land they were encroaching. This marked the beginning of the subjugation of the Tembu, Pondo, Fingo and Xhosa in the Transkei. The Xhosa in particular fought nine wars spanning a century, which gradually deprived them of their independence and subjugated them to British colonial rule.
In the towns, tension was also increasing between settlers and the Dutch authorities, with the former becoming increasingly resentful at what they perceived as administrative interference. Soon the districts of Swellendam and Graaff-Reinette pronounced themselves independent Republics, though this was short-lived - in 1795 Britain annexed the Cape Colony.
This development and, in particular, the emancipation of slaves in 1834, had dramatic effects on the colony, precipitating the Great Trek, an emigration North and Northeast of about 12 000 discontented Afrikaner farmers, or Boers. These people were determined to live independently of colonial rule and what they saw as unacceptable racial egalitarianism.
The early decades of the century had seen another event of huge significance - the rise to power of the great Zulu King, Shaka. His wars of conquest and those of Mzilikazi - a general who broke away from Shaka on a northern path of conquest - caused a calamitous disruption of the interior known to Sotho-speakers as the difaqane (forced migration); while Zulu-speakers call it the mfecane (crushing).
Shaka set out on a massive programme of expansion, killing or enslaving those who resisted in the territories he conquered. Peoples in the path of Shaka's armies moved out of his way, becoming in their turn aggressors against their neighbours. This wave of displacement spread throughout Southern Africa and beyond. It also accelerated the formation of several states, notably those of the Sotho (present-day Lesotho) and of the Swazi (now Swaziland).
This denuded much of the area into which the Trekkers now moved, enabling them to settle there in the belief that they were occupying vacant territory. Of these Voortrekkers, about five thousand settled in the area that later became known as the Orange Free State (present day Free State). The rest headed for Natal (present day KwaZulu-Natal) where they appointed a delegation, under the leadership of Piet Retief to negotiate with the Zulu King, Dingaan (Shaka's successor), for land. Initially, Dingaan granted them a large area of land in the central and southern part of his territory but Retief and his party were later murdered at the kraal of Dingane.
The newly elected Voortrekker leader, Andries Pretorius, prepared the group for a retaliatory attack and the Zulu were subsequently defeated at the famous Battle of Blood River, 16 December 1838, leading to the founding of the first Boer Republic in Natal.
The discovery of Gold and Diamonds
The discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1886) transformed South African from an agrarian society at the edge of world trade into a globally integrated industrial economy, which spurred wealth and immigration and intensified the subjugation of the indigenous inhabitants as well as the conflicts between the Dutch and the British. The mineral revolution led to the quick spread of European colonization into the interior. The period saw the making of magnates and migrants, of millionaires and bankrupts, shopkeepers and entrepreneurs. It also saw the emergence of a new working class, one that was deeply divided along both colour and social lines.
Racist laws enabled the white-owned mining companies to control workers, keep wages very low and gain immense profits from the diamonds and gold that black miners extracted from the earth. Most African miners became migrant labourers, spending nine to eleven months of the year in the mines while their wives and children remained in the countryside.
The Anglo-Boer War
Anglo-Boer War, The Mafeking Siege, Boers surrounded Mafeking, with a Long Tom. 1899-1900. © WITS ArchiveThe Anglo-Boer war.
The Voortrekkers in Natal moved northeast after the British defeated them in 1842. They settled north and south of the Vaal River and founded the independent Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek or Transvaal Republic. In 1854, the Contract of Bloemfontein was signed and the Boers founded the Republic of Orange Free State.
British sentiment was strongly in favour of uniting their colonies with the Boer Republics into one union and thereby gaining control of the gold mines of Transvaal. The Boers not only opposed this proposal, they resented and resisted British encroachments.
On 11 February 1899, war broke out between the two Boer Republics and the two British Colonies (the Anglo-Boer War). On 13 March 1900, the British occupied Bloemfontein, then Johannesburg and Pretoria on 1 September.
The Boers continued a guerrilla war, which was countered by the British devastating Boer farms and placing their women and children in concentration camps where some 28 000 died. Although attempts at peace were made as early as March 1900, nothing significant was achieved until 1902. It was only on 31 May that a truce (the Peace Treaty of Vereeniging) was signed between the Boers and the British. The former eventually accepted the peace conditions, including the loss of their independence. As far as the British were concerned, their victory seemed to pave the way for the establishment of the Union of South Africa.
Most rural and urban Black people tried to stay neutral during the war. At the same time, the nature of hostilities made it difficult to avoid getting mixed up in the war, directly or indirectly. As warfare spilled across the countryside, many Black people found themselves in harm’s way.
Some were pulled into participating in military operations by the warring sides; others chose to serve in the war effort to escape extreme rural poverty or in the hope of gain or reward. In addition, some became involved in hostilities against the Boers on their own account, defending themselves against invading commandos, seizing opportunities to settle old scores over land losses or harsh treatment, and seizing opportunities to plunder.
According to Gilliomee and Mbenga (2007), the Anglo-Boer War (or South African War) remains the most terrible and destructive modern armed conflict in South Africa’s history. It was an event that in many ways shaped the history of 20th Century South Africa. The end of the war marked the end of the long process of British conquest of South African societies, both Black and White.
King Dingane ka Senzangakhona
Synopsis
King of the Zulus (1828 – 1840)
First name
Dingane
Last name
ka Senzangakhona
Date of birth
1795
Date of death
February 1840
Location of death
Lebombo Mountains
Gender
male
Dingane ka Senzangakhona was born in 1795 to father Chief Senzangakhona and mother Mpikase kaMlilela Ngobese who was Senzangakhona's sixth and ‘great wife'. [i] Chief Senzangakhona married sixteen women in total and had fourteen known sons, daughters however were not recorded. Very little is known or recorded about Dingane’s childhood or early career. Instead, Dingane enters the record when on the 22 of September 1828 he, with the assistance of his half-brother Mhlangana and servant Mbopha, assassinated his brother and the then Chief of the Zulu – Shaka Zulu. Shaka, the son of Chief Senzangakhona’s third wife, had seized the Zulu chieftainship in 1816, and had thereafter extended the Zulu kingdom. Soon after the murder of Shaka, Dingane had his half-brother Mhlangana murdered and thus rose to the position of Chief of the Zulu. Dingane moved the royal homestead from Nobamba in the emaKhosini valley to a new inland location which he called Mgungundlovu from which he reigned until 1840.
Following the death of both Shaka and Mhlangana and Dingane’s subsequent rise to power messages were relayed to neighbouring dependencies, such as the Europeans of Port Natal, to notify them of the change and assure them that the Zulu’s newest Chief was inclined towards peace and would not harm them. [ii] Shaka’s ‘grand army’ at the time was in the north and was due to return shortly to receive the news of their leaders death. Dingane thus recognised the need to assemble his own military support. Since the majority of Zulu men of military age were up north serving in the ‘grand army’ he had little option but to utilize the menials and herdboys who eventually formed the basis of his home guard regiment which he called uHlomendlini, meaning ‘this which is armed at home’. [iii] The regiment comprised of two companies, the younger men being in the Mnyama (black) section and the older men in the Mhlophe (white) section. Dingane was thus well prepared for the eventual return of the Zulu army who received the news in stunned silence. The warriors were promised peace, a life of ease and the enjoyment of their booty. Furthermore, they were promised the right to marry. The majority of the troops accepted these conditions and bowed to Dingane. The marshal of the army, Mdlaka, however objected. Mdlaka was subsequently strangled in his hut and succeeded by Ndlela as army general.
‘Dingane orders the killing of Piet Retief's party of Voortrekkers’ by Richard Caton Woodville, Jr. Source: Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis in Beeld (1989) by Anthony Preston. Bion Books: Printed in South Africa.
In 1829, shortly after consolidating his power, Dingane oversaw the relocation of the Zulu capital from the hut-city of Dukuza to the traditional Zulu valley near the Mkhumbane stream. This new capital he renamed Mgungundlovu, meaning ‘the secret plot of the elephant’, which referred to his own plot to assassinate Shaka. William Wood, interpreter to Zululand missionary Reverend Francis Owen, described Mgungundlovu as it was then:
“The form of Dingane’s kraal was a circle, it was strongly fenced with bushes and had two entrances. The principal one faced the king’s huts, which were placed at the furthest extremity of the kraal, behind which were his wives’ huts. These extended beyond the circle which formed the kraal, but were also strongly fenced in. On the right-hand side of the principal entrance were placed the huts of Ndlela (Dingane’s captain) and his warriors; and on the left, those of Dambuza (another of his captains) with his men. The kraal contained four cattle kraals which were also strongly fenced and four huts erected on poles which contained the arms of the troops.” [iv]
It is recorded that with Dingane in power, increased prosperity actually came to Zululand. The warriors of the Zulu army, who were now able to marry and set up their own homesteads, were gifted cattle and were thus able to settle down and enjoy the fruits of their victories – ‘a country bulging with looted cattle and captured women, who were set to work to till the fields and produce military reinforcements.’ [v]
During his reign, Dingane was increasingly involved in trading activities with many of the Portuguese traders from early Port Natal. When on 18 February 1829, Dr Alexander Cowie, a former surgeon from the Cape, and Benjamin Green, a Grahamstown merchant, arrived at Dingane’s Nobamba kraal, they were met by a party of about forty Portuguese traders. The Portuguese traders had reportedly been visiting Dingane in an attempt to re-open trading relations and pay their respects to the Chief of the Zulus. Dingane was known to have on many instances traded heads of cattle and hides in exchange for rifles and gunpowder. On a trading expedition to the Zulus a trader by the name of Isaacs noted Dingane’s respect for both firearms and Europeans:
‘He at once acknowledged it to be his opinion that no power he had could combat with another that used firearms; but added, he did not believe any people could conquer the Zulus excepting Europeans.’ [vi]
"Dingane in Ordinary and Dancing Dresses", by Captain Allen Francis Gardiner. Source: Allen Francis Gardiner - "Stamme & Ryke", deur J.S. Bergh, in samewerking met A.P. Bergh. Don Nelson: Kaapstad. 1984.
Fearing the devastation that could follow a potential military clash with Europeans, as early as 1830, Dingane sent an expedition to the Cape in an attempt to establish good relations with the British. On 21 November 1830 the group reached Grahamstown and presented four tusks to the Civil Commissioner. John Cane, Dingane’s ambassador, relayed the message that Dingane wanted to live in peace with his neighbours, that he wished to encourage trade and would protect traders, and that he desired a missionary.
In January 1832, the government at the Cape finally showed an interest in the affairs of Zululand and sent a well-known explorer Doctor Andrew Smith to investigate more. Smith was well received by Dingane and entertained him with his beautifully dressed women and dancing warriors. Upon his return to the Cape, Smith was reportedly very enthusiastic about Natal and boasted about the greenness and fertility of the region. Thus, in early 1834, the farmers of the Grahamstown and Uitenage region organized a so-called ‘commission trek’ to visit Natal and consider settlement. Twenty-one men and one women, using fourteen wagons, traversed the Natal midlands led by a certain Petrus Lafras Uys. [vii] Nearing the region of Dingane’s capital, the group sent a man named Richard King to meet with Dingane in person and request land. Dingane received the request with interest but demanded that the commission members themselves visit him. There seemed to be countless different obstacles which hindered the commission members from visiting Dingane personally. Uys himself was down with a fever and subsequently sent his younger brother, Johannes Uys, to meet with Dingane. Johannes soon returned with a report that Dingane had allegedly indicated that Natal was vacant and available for European settlement.
Dingane and the Voortrekkers
An illustration of Dingane’s Kraal by Margaret Cary Image source
It was only in 1837 however, with the arrival of the Voortrekkers into the Natal region, that these negotiations would come to fruition. In October 1837 the group of Voortrekkers led by Piet Retief reached Port Natal where they were welcomed by the British ivory traders who occupied the area. On 19 October Retief sent a letter to Dingane as a sign of peace and to inform him that he’d be coming up to Mgungundlovu to discuss the question of land.
Retief and the Voortrekkers described Dingane as a:
'robust, fat man, but well proportioned and with the regular features of a well-bred Zulu. There was nothing at all forbidding in his appearance. He was always smiling and was scrupulously clean, being well scrubbed every morning by some of his women in the royal bath, a depression in the ground near his hut. He was shaved every day as well. He hated hair on his head, and one of his women kept him as bald and clean-shaven as a new-born babe, by means of an exceedingly sharp axe. After his toilet, and being well rubbed with fat, he generally spent his day sitting in an armchair attending to business, drinking beer and playing with any new gew-gaws some European visitor might have given him, such as a telescope to watch his people around the kraal, or a magnifying glass to burn holes in the arms of his servants.’ [viii]
Upon his arrival, Dingane entertained Retief and his men with dances, feasts and sham fights and discussions regarding the allocation of land commenced. From this point on sources differ greatly. Dingane supposedly declared that he was prepared to grant Retief an extensive area between the Tugela and the Umzimvubu as well as the Drakensberg, on condition that Retief restored to Dingane the cattle stolen from him by Sikonyela (the Tlokwa chief). Dingane felt that this would prove to him that Sikonyela and not the Voortrekkers had in fact stolen the cattle. Some sources claim that Dingane also demanded rifles. With the wisdom of hindsight, it seems that Retief was incredibly naive in his dealings with Dingane. What is also evident is that Dingane had experienced more than enough trouble from the handful of whites at Port Natal and probably never had any intention of allowing a large amount of heavily armed farmers to settle permanently in his immediate neighbourhood.
The Voortrekkers obtained the cattle from the Sikonyela as per the deal with Dingane. Retief surrendered the cattle but refused to hand over the horses and the guns he had taken from the Tlokwa. In the meantime, however, Dingane’s agents, who had accompanied Retief to supervise the return of the cattle, reported that even before the land claim had been signed, Voortrekkers were streaming down the Drakensburg passes in large numbers. These allegations allegedly fueled a mistrust between Retief and Dingane. On the 6 February Dingane requested that Retief and his men visit his royal kraal without their guns to drink beer as a farewell gesture. This request was strictly in accordance with Zulu protocol - that nobody appeared armed before the King. Retief suspected no foul play and accepted the invitation. As soon as the Voortrekker party was inside the royal kraal, Dingane gave the order and his regiments overpowered Retief and his men, and took them up to a hill to be executed. Dingane subsequently sent out his warriors to kill the rest of the Voortrekkers awaiting Retief's return from Mgungundlovu. Hundreds of Voortrekkers were consequently killed at Bloukrans and Moordspruit which set off months of bloody conflict between the Voortrekkers and Dingane's Zulus.
In response, Voortrekker leaders Hendrik Potgieter and Piet Uys sent out an expedition against Dingane, but were defeated at Italeni. The conflict culminated in the battle at the Ngome River on 16 December 1838, in which the Zulus suffered a severe defeat. The Ngome River was subsequently renamed Bloedriver or Blood River, referring to the deep red colour of the river filled with Zulu blood. The incident became known as the Battle of Blood River.
Led by new Voortrekker leader Andries Pretorius, a Voortrekker commando went to Mgungundlovu to confront Dingane. But Dingane had burned down his whole kraal and the Zulus launched an attack on the command at the White Umfolozi River. In the meantime, the British occupied Port Natal (now Durban). From there, they advanced on Dingane, but were defeated at the Tugela River. Dingane's warriors also attacked the settlement at Port Natal.
In September 1839, another half-brother of Dingane, Mpande, defected with many followers to Natal. There, the Voortrekkers recognised his as the ‘Prince of the Emigrant Zulus'. On Christmas Eve 1839, the British garrison withdrew from Port Natal. Almost at once, the Voortrekkers hoisted the flag of the Republic of Natalia and made an alliance with Mpande's supporters to make a joint attack on Dingane. In February 1840, Mpande's forces finally decisively defeated Dingane on the Maqongqo hills. He fled north across the Phongolo River, where it is believed he met his death in the Lebombo Mountains at the hands of the Nyawo and his old enemy, the Swazi.
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Document 52 - LA. Jordaan, “A Critique of Mr. W. P. van Schoor’s.The Origin and Development of Segregation in South Africa” Discussion,
It was during the course of a Memorial Lecture held under the auspices of a Cape Province Coloured teachers' organisation in October, 1950, to honour the memory of one of its members, that Mr. W.P. van Schoor propounded his ideas on a subject which was finally published in booklet form [....] Except for the acclamation of the author as a new historian" by the sponsors of the book, and a brief report on it in the local press, Mr. van Schoor's work passed without comment, discussion or analysis. This cannot surely be the end of a historical work which represents a radical and decisive departure from all the histories hitherto written on South Africa. For here is an author who has boldly undertaken the task of writing a short history from the point of view and in the interest of a general evolution of South African humanity to higher social and political forms. The author himself epitomises the function of historiography in the first and last sentence of his booklet: "A people desiring to emancipate itself must understand the process of its enslavement." [...] the author attempts to explain not only how the present South Africa evolved out of the past, but how the genesis of this country has created the complex and intricate problems, the solution of which falls four-square on the people of South Africa themselves. The book is therefore not merely a matter of academic interest, of historical draughtsman ship and accuracy in the presentation of our historical past. No. The author clearly sees in history the key to the understanding of the present which in turn is the indispensable guide to the future. That is why Mr. van Schoor's work is an entirely new approach to South African history. That is why it demands the attention of all those who are interested in the continued evolution of South Africa. It is indeed a reflection on the inspirers of the Memorial Lecture that, for reasons best known to them, they have remained silent on a work which they merely dismissed by an unwarrantable and meaningless eulogy.
Mr. van Schoor has entered a field of study which has up to now been completely monopolised by the official historians in the service of the ruling classes and in the interests of the status quo. [....]
In the appraisal of Mr. van Schoor's work I will use the author's own dictum [....] as the yardstick for the critique. Having read the book one must therefore ask oneself the following questions: Do we now understand the process of our enslavement? Do we understand the evolution of modem South Africa and the present national set-up in the light of this work? Do we have a better understanding and appreciation of the manifold problems which face the peoples of South Africa in their democratic strivings? What theoretical and political lessons can one draw from the author's analysis of the process of our enslavement? Does Mr. van Schoor indicate the course of South Africa's future evolution? [....]
THE BANEFUL EFFECT OF THE AUTHOR'S ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO OUR PROBLEMS
1.The Need for a Social Approach to History
Political theory influences our political orientation, poses our practical tasks and clarifies our aims. It is the indispensable guide to political struggle. On the correctness of our theory depends the whole future of the liberatory movement. But what determines our political theory? The most painstaking historical and sociological analysis. Every political in the emancipatory movement, engaged in the interpretation of historical evidence and the assessment of the forces at work in society, must realise the cardinal importance of this work.
Documentary evidence is the raw material out of which the historian reconstructs e past to explain the present. But it is impossible to understand the present if one merely regards history as a series of events. [....] it is the fundamental task of the historian to discover the laws and the forces which generate events and which lead to the rise and fall of special institutions. It is on this basis that history becomes a science, id the indispensable aid in the interpretation of the present. And it is on the basis of determining the general laws underlying the social changes that the future becomes predictable. [....]
If politics is therefore the expression of fundamental class interests which have their basis in economy, then it is clear that economics is in the final reckoning the determining factor in social change. The question of race and colour, racialism and colour prejudice, while they often tend to have logic of their own, are finally merely the superstructure of basic class conflicts.
The temptation every student of South African history should therefore learn to resist is the temptation to conceive of South Africa's evolution and the process of our enslavement in terms of anthropological entities. [....] in South Africa, beset as it is with multi-racial problems, it is a great inducement - incidently the easiest way -to explain the nature of our historical and political problems in terms of race, racialism and colour. For it is precisely in this country that social or class conflicts tend to coincide vim the lines of the race and colour.
2. The Author's Preoccupation with Racial Categories.
The greatest weakness of Mr. van Schoor's book from which all its other weaknesses naturally flow is the author's inability to resist the temptation. The result is the other side of the coin of Herrenvolkism from which political poison can and must follow. While the official historians have hitherto attempted - and attempted with some degree of success - to paint the white whiter and the blacks blacker, Mr. van Schoor tries to paint the white black and blacks white. The result is the same. Not only does he not find any difference between the Dutch and the British policies in South Africa, not only does he regard the white workers, the white labour aristocrats and the mining magnates is a homogeneous white mass, but he proceeds on the basis of his racial approach to identify slaves with Hottentots, Hottentots with Bushman and the Bantu with the Cape coloured people. And how does he attempt to effect this? By approaching history in reverse. I am referring to his naive attempt to explain the past in the light of the present national set-up, rather than the present in the light of the past. [....] In his attempt to project preconceived political notions on to the historical past, the author forces historical facts into a political straightjacket and proceeds to write some questionable history. Let me illustrate. As a consistent democrat, the author rightly sees the political need for Non-European unity as the indispensable pre-requisite for the launching of a mass democratic movement. The only honest way of approaching such a question is to dwell on the indivisibility of Non-European oppression which has placed all the racial groups, Coloured, Indians, Malay and African in the camp of the oppressed. But the author seeks to "justify" the idea of Non-European unity by obliterating the lines of distinction between the Non-European racial groups and by transferring this idea into the historical past. Thus he writes that the institution of slavery "has had an extremely bad effect in retarding the Non-European struggle for liberation and is beginning to die out only now among the oppressed Non-European people of South Africa." It would therefore seem that the Non-European as a whole at one time existed in the state of slavery. History, however, has it that neither the Bantu, the Hottentots, the Bushman nor the Cape Coloureds were legally chattel slaves. Only a small percentage of the present black population, namely the Malays and a few Coloureds, has slave anteceÂdents. It was the policy of the Dutch not to enslave the indigenous people of South Africa. How this institution of slavery therefore hampered the struggle for liberation is difficult to understand.
A number of anachronisms creep into the book in the author's attempt to explain the slow development of Non-European unity. Thus we hear that it was because of "their relatively privileged position as artisan slaves that the Malay slaves "developed an I attitude of aloofness." As if they had then as slaves to unite with the tribal Bantu groups! As if the need for Non-European unity arose not in recent years but in 1652! Then we are asked to accept the idea that the "bad heritage of subservience and inferiority to the ruling class is due to the "intermediate position of the Hottentots as household servants...together with an isolation from the black workers"! Why the Hottentots should have united with other blacks, and who were tribalists, not workers, then is difficult to understand. [....]
3, The Author's Tribal "Heroes": an Example to Democracy?
The black chauvinist is as determined as the white chauvinist to create his stock of national heroes. [....] Thus at a time when the Non-Europeans cannot speak of any national heroes, Mr. van Schoor, in his attempt to give his racial approach to history a sort of moral sanction, turns the wheel of history back to fish out "national heroes" for the Non-Europeans. And from where? From the primitive Bantu and Hottentot tribes! It is difficult to understand why a consistent democrat like Mr. van Schoor should elevate a number of tribal chiefs to the position of "national heroes" and by implication deprecate the dissolution of the primitive tribal societies and the development of industrialism - the indispensable pre-requisite for a democratic society in South Africa. [....]
The study of the movements of various Bantu tribes clearly reveals that each tribe was bent on territorial expansion which it tried to realise at the expense of the extermination of another. The Zulu king, Chaka, had during the early nineteenth century extended his domains by a rigorous military system and a terrible discipline. The neighbouring tribes, particularly the Xhosa, were forced to flee in the face of Chaka's expansionist policy and rule of terror. [....] Mr. van Schoor [...] eulogises the work of Chaka who had terrorised Gaika and Ndlambi. [....] One must certainly defend the tribes against the land robbery of the Dutch and the British, but to eulogise and hold up as an example the primitive chiefs is not the work of a modem democratic movement.
To the black chauvinist van Riebeeck occupies the same place in South African history as the doctrine of "Original Sin" in theology. It is to this humble servant of a commercial company that all the ills of society are attributable. [....] And what is the upshot of it all? Every evil is laid at the door of the white man. [ ....]
SOUTH AFRICA HAD NO FEUDAL PHASE IN ITS HISTORY.
1. The Author Leaves the Door Open for the "Feudal Theory"
[...] having developed at a slow tempo under commercial capitalism from a half-way house to a commercial colony, the Africans were rudely torn away from their tribal mode of life and geared to a modem industrial machine as wage earners. The depend-ice of the mines on cheap labour made the task of expropriating the Africans from their tribal lands the unpostponable demand of the incipient capitalists. The disintegration of African tribal life was accordingly effected by taxation and wars and the subsequent need for European coinage and goods. In the course of a few decades after 1870, the Africans were violently hurled into the streams of capitalism by sword and fire. The Industrial Revolution in South Africa gave them no opportunity, no breathing space to settle down with the dissolution of tribal life as private landholders. Under the tremendous impact of capitalism, they were forced and absorbed into the economic veins of capitalism, bearing heavily the scars of tribalism. The Africans knew of no age between tribalism and the cash nexus.
It must not, however, be taken to mean that industrial capitalism destroyed every vestige of the pre-1870 institutions. [....] In South Africa the industrialists have judiciously preserved the outer forms of chieftainship, tribal categories and combine and integrated these with modem industrial forms. But this preservation of the shells, ' the relics of the past are not the fundamental characteristics, the essence of the social order. They are mere incidentals, mere reminders of the past.
The whole argument in Mr. van Schoor's book, as a few good passages indicate, rids to bear out the above argument. This is the author's best contribution. However, the author's characterisation of the Voortrekker republics, the African labourer and the migratory labour system, he draws certain unwarrantable conclusions which point the existence of feudalism at a certain stage in South Africa's development as well the existence of feudal elements today. One therefore gains the impression that he is living the door wide open for the theory that South Africa is feudal now seeking shelter from the intellectual storms. This makes it necessary to deal with some of his remarks on this subject. For from the theory South Africa was and is feudal, definite political conclusions must flow.
On the political plane this theory wears the ballroom dress of the "agrarian" slogan, Thus according to the advocates of this theory, the fundamental political task is to rid society of the feudal stalactites and stalagmites and achieve for the people the full and legal ownership of their land, like the August 4th decrees of the French Revolution. The fundamental demand of the people, according to them, is therefore for land. [....]
2 What is Feudalism?
[”¦] Feudalism is a state of society in which the political, economic and legal status of every individual came to be inextricably bound up with a contractual relationship based the tenure of land. [....]
In the Boer pastoral communities no feudal system could emerge, because the pastoralists lived in a semi-nomadic state. For feudalism, to quote Franck-Brentano, is agriculture without movement. They held land from the Company on a system of rent, not military, clerical or labour services. The Hottentot and Bantu servants rendered labour services in return for food, not for grants of land. In point of fact, until 1828, the Hottentots could not own land or work a plot of land. Under feudalism, personal services to one's master had to be territorialized, that is, they had to be accompanied by a grant of land. The Hottentots were, in short, not medieval serfs.
Politically, feudalism means the decentralisation of political power and its delegation to a number of strong feudal lords by the king. [....]
The Voortrekker states were, on the other hand, centralized in the People's Council or Volksraad which made laws for all the Boers. Everyone came under the jurisdiction of the central authority. The local authorities - the Landdrost and field comets - merely carried out the instructions of the central authorities to whom they were responsible. The tendency was always in the nature of centralization, which is inimical to feudal political theory.
A few liberal historians, notably De Kiewiet and Agar-Hamilton, are quick to draw comparisons between Voortrekker-Bantu relations and feudalism to show that the Boers established a stable system in which their relations with the blacks were based on reciprocity of rights and services. It is a pity that our "new historians" should fall into the same error, which is tantamount to the whitewashing of white-black relations.
The liberal historians have subtly tried to see in the practice of a number of chiefs to place themselves under the protection of white farmers a resemblance to the feudal practice of "commendation". But this is precisely why it is not feudalism. "CommenÂdation" or "recommendation" was merely the means whereby the feudal system was built up in the course of centuries during which the weak and helpless placed themselves under the protection of the strong. It is not a feature of feudal society itself. The practice of "commendation" must, in a word, be discontinued to end chaos and anarchy and stabilise the feudal structure.
The Voortrekkers could not carry the practice of "commendation" to a logical conclusion by integrating the Bantu into their pastoral economy. The very similarity of the Boer and the Bantu economies, based as they were on land and cattle, was hostile to such assimilation. Their interests were indeed so similar that they both constituted themselves into two armed camps. The result was territorial segregation. To be sure, Bantu children and adults were, through their chiefs, recruited as farm hands and domestic servants. But such services were not accompanied by grants of land. They were not feudalized. Some petty chiefs, on the other hand, seeking refuge from other tribal "heroes", were given temporary residence within the borders of the Transvaal Republic. But even the liberal historians have to admit that such protection as was offered them was a very insecure and hazardous one. At any time they could be expelled. Their temporary residence was therefore not part of perpetual feudal contracts, of feudal tenure and territorialisation.
Feudalism offered three main obstacles to the free development of capitalist commodity production. The abrogation of these barriers constituted the historic mission of the capitalist class.
Firstly, the capitalist entrepreneur was faced with the task of creating a proletariat [....] The solution of the first problem was the solution of the second: the creation of a home market for the mass-produced goods of the industrialists. [....]
The third problem was political: how to absorb the scattered political power that existed under feudalism into the hands of a central authority which could legislate in the interests of the capitalist class. The creation of the centralized political state was finally achieved.
In South Africa the mining magnates were faced with the same problems which were, however, complicated by the presence of a compact tribal system. They could not effectively achieve the expropriation of the Africans by an enclosure system. The indivisibility of primitive tribal communalism called for more bloody measures. Wars and taxation had to accomplish the dissolution of tribal life.
The call for Confederation of the various provinces was not a mere move for white unity to crush the Africans, as Mr. van Schoor alleges it to be. It was a political move by the mining magnates to create a centralized authority which could protect and legislate in the interests of the capitalist economy. The South Africa Act, 1909, created the central state power.
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA
1. Modern South Africa is Rooted in the Industrialisation of 1870
The foundations of modem South Africa were laid neither by the Dutch East India Company in 1652 nor by the British liberal Cape in 1806. The present-day society of this country has its roots in the Industrial Revolution which began with the opening up of the diamond mines in Kimberley and the gold mines on the Witwatersrand towards the end of the third quarter of the nineteenth century. [....]
If twentieth century South Africa is not the product of either early Dutch society or the old liberal Cape, then neither is it the product of the patriarchal Voortrekker pastoral society. Moreover, neither is it a synthesis of the Voortrekker north and the liberal south. It is the creation of an entirely new economic system which, by its new techniques in the process of production, radically altered the old social relationships; evolved new classes rooted in the new process of production and produced a modem political structure to give expression to this change. Up to 1870 South African history is characterised by the slow tempo of her development; after 1870, this country took a tremendous leap which brought her within the course of a few decades into line with modem industrial forms. The introduction of new techniques for the exploitation of the mines is the driving force of this social revolution.
The Cape Colony, the basis of whose subsistence was agriculture, commerce and pastoralism, had no policy of residential, social and political segregation within the orbit of commercial capitalism. Neither did it have a colour bar. It finally and legally recognised the equality of all races. And although social differentiation in practice tool: the form of colour, this is because class and colour lines coincided. The Hottentots and early Cape Coloureds, in addition to the detribalised Bantu on the eastern frontier, came to be the exploited class within the framework of political and legal equality. When therefore, one compares the present national set-up with the British Cape, then it is clear that British liberalism was a force before 1870. The Industrial Revolution reversed this trend of political and economic assimilation, and gradually abrogated the time-halÂlowed liberal policy of political and legal equality.
The Voortrekker pastoral society, on the other hand, was economically and socially incapable of integrating the black into its subsistence economy lest it be consumed in the process. The very similarities of their respective modes of life, based as they were on land and cattle, precluded the possibility of such a development. The Boers therefore pursued a policy of what one can call territorial segregation. This segregation was based on the complete separation, socially and economically, of the Boers and the Bantu. Thus it has not connection with the modem system of social, residential and political segregation which flows from the integration and interdependence of black and white.
[....] The essential basis for South Africa's rapid industrialisation since 1870 was the presence of a large permanently settled white population in this country at the inception of mining. British Imperialism had to consider this white element when it embarked upon the intensive exploitation of the country, before as well as after the discovery of gold and diamonds. Without this population in 1870, Great Britain would have occupied this country on military lines and administered it on the same lines as the South American states or West African colonies. There would have been no such constitutional progress of the various colonies to responsible government which formed the basis for Union and complete political autonomy. There would have been no industrial progress in the form of manufacturing industries. For without the whites, South Africa would still perhaps have been a large mining camp. The presence of a large white population is intimately bound up with the rapid industrialisation of modem South Africa.
Let it be understood that Britain never really had it all her own way in South Africa. She was forced to grant the whites certain political and economic rights which would never have come, or at least come very much later, had they not been here in 1870. The Boers fought hard for and forced Britain after the Anglo-Boer War to give them those privileges which they today enjoy in the form of a colour bar, industrial and social, a labour aristocracy and a full democracy. Without them it is difficult to conceive the present-day South Africa with these social institutions.
In an analysis of the modem colour bar, it is necessary to pose and answer the following questions clearly: What is the colour bar? How and where did it originate? How was it consolidated? What are the conditions for its elimination? All these questions are of vital importance to the democratic movement. Yet our author fails to answer any one of these questions. [....]
2, The Foundations of the Modern Colour Bar
[....] The industrial colour bar and all its concomitants - social and political segregation -are the products of capitalist commodity production which began in Kimberley and on the Witwatersrand. The dependence of modern techniques of capital on labour called for the concentration of labour in the industrial centres. The Bantu had, in short, to be swung into the new industrial system. Skilled labour had to be imported from overseas. In this process of economic integration, economic circumstances, practice, white public opinion which were finally sustained by law, made a strict separation in the two types of labour employed; skilled work at high rates of pay was from the outset the monopoly of the whites; unskilled work at low rates of pay came to be associated with black labour. In the mining industry this practice finally received the sanction of the law by the Mines and Works Act of 1911. It was subsequently extended to other industries. This is the industrial colour bar. . .
Mr. van Schoor merely sees the hand of Herrenvolkism in this arrangement. "In Kimberley," he says, "Rhodes and his associates developed a 'civilised' labour policy for imported Europeans and maintained African wages at the lowest level. Out of this arose the high ratio between skilled and unskilled rates of pay, unique in the world." We do not know in what respects this high ratio between skilled and unskilled rates of pay is unique in the world. What is unique is the fact that in South Africa a large group of people is excluded from occupying skilled jobs in a modem industry. There is no parallel anywhere else. To see in this arrangement merely race and colour is meaning-less. One must take into consideration the class interests of the mining capitalists who are mainly concerned with quick profits. According to our author it seems that the industrialists were bent from the outset on raising the wage rates of the whites and correspondingly lowering the wage rates of the Africans. This then raises the question whether this arrangement was the cause or result of prejudice or whether the two interacted to cement both.
Let us understand that the Africans who appeared on the industrial field had no knowledge and skill in the use of modem instruments of labour. Unskilled work naturally fell to their lot in the formative stages of mining. Moreover, at the time of the opening of the diamond mines, the vast majority of the Africans came of their own accord in search of European goods and guns. The task of destroying African tribal life was not yet under way. Under such circumstances, the Africans worked for low wages.
On the other hand. South Africa had no skilled whites to operate the complex machinery. Skilled artisans had to be imported. To induce them to come high wage rates were offered. This division between white labour and black labour was therefore made more emphatic because skilled labour from Europe had to work alongside black workers who had just appeared on the scene of civilisation. Thus the wages the African workers received in the early days of mining were about ten shillings per week with rations, while the white workers received from £4 to £5 per peek in the case of overseers and from £6 to £8 in the case of mechanics and engine drivers. When African labour was scarce their wage rates rose to even thirty shillings per week. Coloured artisans were also employed in skilled occupations. It is therefore clear that this division between black and white labours is attributable to the Objective, economic circumstances of the time, and not to racialism and colour prejudice. "The white workers," writes De Kiewiet, "stood out more sharply because they were for the most part not of South African birth."
With the rapid dissolution of African tribal life after 1870 starving Africans appeared on the mines, eager to work at the lowest rates. This partly and temporarily solved the labour problem and depressed African wages still more. The gulf separating black from white wages consequently widened.
3. The Economic Interpretation of Colour Prejudice
...] While Mr. van Schoor finally says that the modem colour bar system "is essentially a British product", he wrongly attributes colour prejudice to the Voortrekkers. [....]
The colour prejudice we know today is not the product of the Boers but of the peculiar conditions and circumstances under which the Industrial Revolution developed in this country. The pastoral semi-nomadic Boers had a military hostility and fear of a similar economic group which they could only distinguish from themselves by religion and colour. The two groups could not be integrated into one society because their economic habits were so similar. The colour prejudice we know today flows from the integration of black and white in an industrial society in which the preferential treatment of the whites by the British has revolutionised the whole psychology of the Boers. The Anglo-Boer War was a sharp lesson to the British that without granting concessions, privileges and rights to the Boers, her rule over South Africa with its teeming millions would be unstable. [....]
Objective conditions themselves first inculcated the idea of colour prejudice into the white. The particular disposition of black labour, on the one hand, and white labour, on the other hand, produced the idea that the division between skilled and unskilled labour
and high and low rates of pay was a natural, permanent and immutable one. They came to regard this division as a legitimate institution imposed from above, and not the product of the peculiar circumstances from below. Shortly after the inception of a diamond mining, the whites of this country developed a strong feeling of colour in relation to the productive process. De Kiewiet says that before "the diggers were themselves reduced by the capitalist mining companies to the state of employees, they had decided that no other place was open to the native than that of low-paid and unskilled labour".
This colour prejudice rapidly become more intense when two important social forces arose out of the new techniques of production: a South African born white artisan class and a black proletariat.
The Industrial Revolution in South Africa not only led to the dissolution of tribal life, it also dealt a death blow to the isolation, the particularize of the Boer subsistence economy. For when the demand for agriculture and pastoral products to feed the industrial population became great, the white farmer began to exploit their farms as fully as possible to produce for a large market. The demand for agricultural produce had even led the mining companies to speculate in land and buy large areas which they began to exploit to feed the industrial population. Land prices rose rapidly; many farmers could not adjust themselves to this revolution in agriculture and sold out. The new capitalist farmers, in order to exploit every available stretch of land, were less and Mess inclined to give the ruined whites refuge on their estates. The white bywoners, who had, because of land hunger, taken refuge on the estates of the big farmers, were evicted. Black labour was preferred to white labour on the farms. And so the exodus to the industrial areas began. There they were confronted by a mass of cheap black labour with whom they could not compete in unskilled work. Neither were they trained for skilled work. The Industrial Revolution had produced the "Poor White Problem".
What does Mr. van Schoor say about the "Poor White Problem"? He writes: "...the inability to compete with Non-European labour in country and town was not simply due to the lack of training; it was due to an attitude of contempt for labour which was regarded as Kaffir work." This is a misunderstanding. The white employers of labour preferred the Bantu labourers to white labour. Economics overruled consideration of race and colour prejudice.
With the inability of the impoverished whites to compete with the blacks in industry, with the gradual acquisition of technical skill by the black workers and their utilisation to a small extent as semi-skilled and skilled workers, and with the preference of the mining companies for cheap black workers, there was a loud public outcry against this stage of affairs. The impoverished whites began to place the blame for their economic ruination on the shoulders of the blacks. This fed colour prejudice. Public and political opinion grew for the protection of the whites in industry. The position was aggravated by the cleavage of interests between white employer and white worker whose high wage demands the former would not meet. For the higher the wage rates demanded by the white workers became, the more limited became their opportunities to find employment and the more blacks were conscripted. To be sure, the encroachment of the blacks on skilled occupations was very slight indeed. But so sensitive were the white workers to the idea of associating white labour with skilled jobs and high wages that they began political agitation for the preservation and consolidation of the status quo. [....] Their racialism, their colour prejudice, had an economic content - their demand for a place, a protected place, in industry. Their colour prejudice was not the cause for the separation if black and white in industry but the product and consolidator of it. [....]
4. The Consolidation of the Industrial Colour Bar
Such is the genesis of the modem colour bar. Since its conception almost fifty years have elapsed during which it has shown no obvious signs of collapsing. On the contrary. it has permeated every industry which has developed in South Africa. It is being maintained despite the fact that the rationalisation in production which largely elimiÂnates the need for "skilled" operatives has developed at a rapid rate in South Africa. It is being maintained despite the fact that the African workers are becoming more and more acquainted with the production methods of modem industry and are capable of doing most of the so-called skilled work, or could do so with very little training. It is being maintained despite the fact that it is the chief source of annoyance and financial loss to the Chamber of Mines. Today, political expediency which had forced upon the Chamber of Mines the colour bar, is being mercilessly pounded by the laws of economic necessity which no longer sees the justification of the indefinite continuation of a while labour aristocracy. Profits are dwindling; cuts shall have to be made somewhere. This top-heavy social institution is being strained to the utmost. The economic base is now pounding the superstructure of political expediency, race and colour prejudice.
After the Great War of 1914-18, however, the colour bar has become more rigid. Not only did the extension of the statutory colour bar to other industrial field-consolidate the labour status quo, but the increase in power and co-ordination of the white trade unions and the corresponding lack of organisation, lack of rights and docility of the black workers led to increased rates of pay and better working conditions for the white workers.
"Segregation is more rigorous in the factory than in the mines," writes Mr. van Schoor. Is this really so? In the factory, to be sure, there is not the same rigorous enforcement of the statutory provisions of the colour bar. Non-European factory workers are more intimate with the technical processes of production and receive rates-of pay which are superior to those of the Chamber of Mines. The author, however, says that the "ratio of white to non-white wages in secondary industry" is evidently not decreasing. But a careful study of the wage rates of the two groups shows that there has been a definite narrowing of the gap. In 1915 the ratio was 4,85; in 1919 it was 4,84, and in 1924 it was 4,5. Then there was an increase to 4,27 in 1927, but in 1929 it fell to 4,08. In 1938 the ratio was 4,36 and it fell to 3,5 in 1944, rising to 3,47 in 1945. This decrease, slight though it is, proved that the economic demands of the Non-European workers are increasing. It vaguely foreshadows the future of the Industrial Colour Bar.
In the gold mining industry the colour bar is rigidly being maintained. From 1911 to 1915 European wages amounted to an average of £330 annually. In 1920 European wages averaged £501 and then declined to £372 in 1923. In 1938 it was £404, and in 1947 it was £579. As regards Non-European wages, the average cash wages for 1911 was £28 5s.; for 1923 it-was £34 1s., and in 1938 £36 6s. "In 1938 both average cash wages of Natives and average European wages were almost 21,3% above the 1911 level." The gap is being maintained. For example, the average increase of European wages in the diamond industry was 23% from 1911 to 1938, and for Non-Europeans for the same period it was 11,7%. In the coal mining industry the average increase of European wages from 1911 to 1938 was 39,4%, and for Non-Europeans 37,3%.'
In July 1918, the Chamber of Mines recognised the Status Quo Agreement, which reaffirmed the colour bar system in the mining industry. [....]
In an attempt to modify this agreement, the Chamber of Mines precipitated the 1922 strike. [....] In 1926 the Mines and Works Act was amended to exclude Africans and Asiatics from acquiring certificates of competency to do skilled work. For already, in 1925, the Mining Regulations Commission had spoken of the competition of the African labourer which would lead to the elimination of the European worker "from the entire range of mining operations".
There can be no doubt that the Chamber of Mines views the white worker with an ambivalence of emotions. For the conditions and circumstances under which the colour bar arose have vanished. Political considerations are, however, still stronger than the need to cut down on the heavy cost structure, either by reducing European wages or by replacing the whites in skilled jobs by black labour. But so great is the strength of the organised white working class, so strong their political voice, and so docile and rightless the unorganised workers that legislative and administrative measures are still the main props for the support of the colour bar in industry.
5. The Conditions for the Elimination of the Colour Bar
What then are the conditions necessary for the elimination of the colour bar? For this is the fundamental task of the political movement for democracy: to bring the wage rates of the black worker to the level of Europeans and to eliminate the artificial barriers separating "skilled from unskilled" in industry. Two factors combine to this end: in the automatic process outside human agency and in the political struggle through human agency to bring about its abrogation.
Mr. van Schoor only sees the former [....] The problem of raising the standards of life of the black workers does not enter the mind of the writer. Moreover, he ignores the rapid increase in the number of proletarians settled permanently in the towns where, it is clear, they will one day organise into a mighty social force and play the decisive part in the struggle of the abolition of the colour bar. [....] -The elimination of the industrial colour bar is inextricably bound up with the increase in the number of permanent black workers. For such a development will indubitably lead to the organiÂsation of the black proletariat and their participation as a force in the industrial struggles that lie ahead. Yet Mr. van Schoor only sees the objective factor of economic necessity. Such an automatic abolition of the colour bar is the dream of opportunism and the product of political abstentionism.
The Non-Europeans have up to now been putty in the hands of the employers, not only because they are voiceless and voteless, but because they are not an organised force that can struggle for higher wages and better working conditions. But Mr. van Schoor must not consider that they will remain a permanent, docile mass, incapable of any struggle. Such an attitude of mind is already the beginning of capitulation to the status quo. This striking omission of the role of the liberatory movement to wrench away the props that support the colour bar is the beginning of defeatism, of lack of faith and optimism in the democratic struggle. History is made by people under definite conditions. That history will only be made when the proletariat steps into the political arena as an organised industrial force.
6 The Economics of Black Chauvinism
Mr. van Schoor's anthropological approach once more reveals its baneful influence on author's assessment of black and white wages and the productive output of the respective labour groups. [....]
He argues that "the European worker in secondary industry is deadweight." [....] We are therefore given to understand that the South African capitalists are not really interested whether the white workers produce new social values. It seems that racialism and colour prejudice overrule all economic considerations. According to Mr. van Schoor, the black workers alone contribute towards the productive output. In other words, technical skill, the economic planning commissions, the skilled overseers and engineers play no part in the productive output. All production is dependent - on whom? On the semi- and unskilled black workers who are not allowed to handle modern machinery freely. Thus we finally have the formulae: Skilled workers = unproductive; unskilled work = productive; white = unproductive; black = productive.
Two statements on production prove that the author is not at all serious about the above statement: "When 80% of the population is forbidden to handle machinery, technical progress must necessarily slow." So? The Non-Europeans are not very productive after all! Technical skill is, after all, necessary to industry! The whites, after all, produce new values! [....]
Even in a democratic society, skilled workers will have to be paid more than workers who are less skilled. For without this technical skill production will be slow, poverty will continue to haunt democracy and elementary needs will not be satisfied. Does the writer imagine that unskilled workers and manual workers can build a democratic society? The reason for the low productivity of this country lies in the fact that the Non-Europeans are not allowed to participate fully in the process of production. The abolition of the colour bar, therefore, also means a tremendous increase in production.
7. The Proletariat as the Greatest Force in the Country.
[....] Since the opening of the mines, the establishment of factories and the beginning if capitalist agriculture, the areas allotted to the Africans have continually shrunk. The result is continued proletarianisation. Africans are forced by land hunger, the need for money to buy European goods and pay their taxes to seek work in the urban areas. The reserves were never set aside to sustain the Africans. Thus, before the depression of 1929-36, the income from production of African families in the reserves was £4 0s. Id. per annum. Today the reserves are a large creche for old woman and children and a short place of rest for the migratory workers.
Since Union the African population has continued to flow from areas of predomiÂnantly African population to the urban centres and European farms. They go yearly from the reserves to the towns; from the towns back to the reserves; from the reserves to European farms and back to the reserves and from farms to the towns and back to the farms. This perennial movement is a unique characteristic of the black proletariat. It is our task to understand how conditions, administrative measures and economic forces dictate this complex migratory labour system.
Once again Mr. van Schoor is unable to see the migratory labour system as a process of development. He simply says: "The Kimberley diamond mines gave rise directly to the vast system of migratory labour flowing between reserves and locations..." How and why this came about he is unable to tell us. Later we hear that, having been rendered homeless, the African was prevented from becoming a settled worker in the towns by the migratory labour system. Then he writes that this labour system also "prevents the settling down of a propertied (!) peasantry." The author here confuses cause and effect. The migratory labour system, contrary to the author, is not the cause of the inability of the Africans to become either a peasantry or a settled urban proletariat, but precisely the result of it. By various administrative measures the Africans are forbidden to settle permanently in urban centres. This is the meaning of the pass laws. After the expiration of his labour contract the pass laws forced him to return to the areas specially set aside for Africans. But here he cannot stay for long because the reserves were never meant to be self-sufficient areas. Poverty and land hunger compel him to seek work in the towns or on the white farms. The result is that he oscillates between reserves and urban areas for European farmers. [....]
Yet, in spite of these administrative measures which prevent the emergence of a permanent urban African proletariat, the very poverty of live in the reserve, the increasing economic demands of the Africans, and the consequent desperate need to augment their frugal incomes, are leading to more and more Africans into the ranks of permanent urban dwellers. Their labour contracts and their stay in the industrial centres are becoming larger. The extension of the urban localities themselves bears testimony to this fact. [....]
Mr. van Schoor: "...if the migratory labour system were to break down, it would at once polarise into a landed (!) peasantry in the country and an organised (!) working-class in the town. . ."[....]
The author does not give us the conditions under which the migratory labour system would break down. He cannot see that the labour and economic needs of the industriÂalists would finally force them to abolish the migratory labour system and allow the migratory African workers to become an integral part of urban life. This is an inescapable development in our social evolution. The wheel of history cannot be turned back either to the revival of tribalism or the settling of the Africans on the land as small producers. Such a development is repugnant not only to the historic process and the development of industry but also to the democratic movement, which can only triumph on the basis of increased industrialisation.
The African worker is not a proletarian in the true sense of the word. Firstly, he is not a permanent urban dweller and therefore does not form an integral part of industrial life, socially and culturally. Secondly, he is debarred by industrial legislation from participating in all the technical processes as a skilled and efficient worker. The development of capitalism will indubitable also lead to the development of a fully-fledged proletariat.
Of the great importance to the liberatory movement is a strict understanding of the forces which are driving more and more Africans irresistibly forward into the capitalist economy as proletarians. The great task of the liberatory movement is to facilitate this development by its struggle for the abrogation of all the administrative measures which prevent the Africans from becoming a settled proletariat; by calling for the abolition of the Industrial Colour Bar to raise the living standards of the African and develop his technical skill; and by demanding political and civil rights to make him a full citizen of this country. [....]
CONCLUSION
[....] This analysis has attempted to show that the weakness in the book flow from a wrong orientation and approach to our social and political problems, an approach which, taking racial categories as its point of departure, has the tendency, though not always, to go to the other extreme of Herrenvolkism - black racialism. It is a tendency that is all too prevalent in Colonial countries where class oppression and exploitation assume the form of and coincide with race and colour. But it is precisely the task of the democratic movement to strip this Colonial oppression of its racial garb and reveal its class content.
All the differences which this critique has with this book are consequential upon the author's anthropological approach. In many respects they are indeed slight, being a matter of emphasis, of underlying principles, of seeing the wood for the trees and objectivity. And although we have reached an important stage in Mr. van Schoor's work on the road to sociological clarification on our political problems, I still consider that our main task in the field of history at present is to deal with and refute the arguments of the official historians writing South Africa's past. They still reign supreme. We are grateful to Mr. van Schoor for having taken another step in this direction. For the clarification of our past is the condition for the clarification of our present, and the clarification of our present the condition for the clarification of political theory and our future. The leadership of the enslaved masses must first understand the process of enslavement before they can lead them on the road to emancipation.